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A FRESH APPROACH TO WHAT IT
MEANS TO BE A RELIGIOUS
REFUGEE
Brienna Bagaric
Jennifer Svilar

Abstract
The world is currently experiencing an unprecedented displaced persons
crisis. There are more than 70 million people worldwide who have been
forcibly displaced from their homeland and are in search of a new country in
which to settle. There is no international appetite to absorb these people.
There is only one legal pathway by which displaced people can claim an
entitlement to settle in another country. This is pursuant to the Refugee
Convention. More than 140 countries including the United States are
signatories to this convention. The difficulty experienced by displaced people
is now particularly acute so far as entry into the United States is concerned
because the Trump Administration has reduced the number of offshore
refugees it will take from 110,000 to 18,000. This is partly as a result of an
unprecedented backlog of asylum seekers that are at border points or in the
United States. Given the intense competition for settlement places in the
United States, it is imperative that decisions regarding refugee eligibility are
made in accordance with transparent and coherent legal standards. Refugee
status can only be granted if a person fears persecution on the basis of one of
five designated grounds. One of the most frequently engaged grounds is
religion. This is especially important given the amount of people who are
displaced because of wars and turmoil which have a religious basis. Despite
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this, there is no coherent or consistent definition that has been given to
religion in the context of the Refugee Convention. This article addresses this
gap in the literature and the jurisprudence and proposes a definition of
religion which is consistent with the objective of the Refugee Convention and
accords with concepts that have been utilized in other countries, namely
Canada and Australia. The definition this article adopts is wider than that
which is currently applied in the United States and will have the effect of
increasing the amount of people that can obtain asylum pursuant to the
Refugee Convention. This will not only contribute to the flourishing of these
individuals but also the integrity of the refugee determination process.
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I.

INTRODUCTION

The number of displaced persons in the world is at an all-time record high.
There are currently more than 70 million people who are displaced from their
homeland and are seeking a new country in which to settle.1 This wave of
displaced people has been met with a high level of resistance by other nations,
which generally are reluctant to absorb foreigners. There is no tenable
solution in the foreseeable future regarding settling these forcibly displaced
people. In particular, there is no established or coherent international program
which provides an avenue that displaced persons can utilize in order to resettle
in another country.
The only international instrument that deals with protecting forcibly
displaced people and imposing an obligation on other countries to settle them
is the 1951 Refugee Convention.2 This instrument is now nearly seventy years
old and has been ratified by more than 140 countries.3 It has provided the
foundation for the settlement of tens of millions of people.4 Although the
instrument is nearly seventy years old, it is now more relevant than ever given
the large number of displaced people. Accordingly, the manner in which the
Convention is interpreted and applied is of cardinal importance to the
flourishing of tens of millions of people.
In broad terms, the instrument imposes an obligation on signatory
countries to provide asylum to people who are outside their homeland and fear
persecution on the basis of one or more of five discrete grounds. These are
religion, political opinion, particular social group, race, and nationality. If
people are outside their homeland and genuinely fear for their safety, but not
for one of these five reasons, they cannot seek asylum pursuant to the
Convention, and indeed there is no other legal basis upon which they can
command protection. Thus, the manner in which the five convention grounds
operate can be determinative of whether a displaced person can validly seek
1. U.N. HIGH COMM’R FOR REFUGEES, GLOBAL TRENDS: FORCED DISPLACEMENT IN 2018, 2
(2019), https://www.unhcr.org/5d08d7ee7.pdf [hereinafter GLOBAL TRENDS 2018].
2. See generally, Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees, July 28, 1951, 189 U.N.T.S. 137
[hereinafter 1951 Refugee Convention] (providing the protocol for nations receiving asylum seekers).
3. States Parties to the 1951 Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees and the 1967 Protocol,
U.N. HIGH COMM’R FOR REFUGEES 1, https://www.unhcr.org/protect/PROTECTION/
3b73b0d63.pdf. Note that there are 146 state parties to the 1967 protocol. Id.
4. See History of UNHCR, U.N. HIGH COMM’R FOR REFUGEES, https://www.unhcr.org/enus/history-of-unhcr.html (last visited Jan. 20, 2021) (noting that the UNHCR has “helped well over 50
million refugees” since its creation).
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protection under the Convention.
This article examines the meaning and scope of one of the key convention
grounds, namely religion. This is an under-researched area of law and one
which has received scant judicial attention in the United States. As a result,
the scope and contours of this convention ground are poorly defined, thereby
leading to inconsistent and incoherent decisions regarding a person’s
eligibility for refugee status. To clarify the appropriate meaning of religion
under the Convention, we analyze the history of the 1951 Refugee
Convention, the commentaries in the documents which underpin the
Convention, and case law in the United States, Canada, and Australia. It
emerges that there is no settled meaning of religion in this context, but
consistent with the overarching objective of the Convention and the general
meaning of religion, we argue that an expansive view of this concept should
be adopted.
An exploration of the meaning of this important convention ground is
particularly important at this point in America’s history. The United States
settles two broad groups pursuant to the Convention. The first is typically
called asylum seekers, which essentially comprises displaced people who are
at border points or indeed already in the United States. Currently, there is a
record backlog of asylees totaling more than 1 million people.5 The second
group is typically called refugees, and these consist of people who are offshore
and are seeking to settle in the United States. Under the Trump
Administration, the number of refugee places that are available has dropped
markedly to a record low. Since President Trump took office in 2017, the
number of places that are available for refugees annually has dropped from
110,000 to only 18,000 currently.6 Given the scarcity of asylum places that
are now available in the United States, it is important that decisions made
regarding asylum eligibility are based on normatively sound and
jurisprudentially accurate criteria. This article aims to enhance the integrity
of the refugee determination process by clarifying the meaning of a key
convention ground. In fact, this ground is particularly important given that
President Trump has indicated recently that his administration is now
5. See Michelle Hackman, U.S. Immigration Courts’ Backlog Exceeds One Million Cases, WALL
STREET J. (Sept. 18, 2019 9:22 AM), https://www.wsj.com/articles/u-s-immigration-courts-backlogexceeds-one-million-cases-11568845885.
6. See Presidential Determination on Refugee Admissions for Fiscal Year 2020, WHITE HOUSE
(Nov. 1, 2019), https://www.whitehouse.gov/presidential-actions/presidential-determination-refugeeadmissions-fiscal-year-2020/.
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prioritizing the extent to which freedom of religion is protected.7 This is a
welcome development in the context of refugee determinations given the large
amount of people that are displaced because of war and civil unrest thathave
a religious backdrop.
In this article, we argue that it is not necessary for an asylum seeker to
establish that they are part of a mainstream religious ideology or that the
ideology has any particular beliefs or convictions. Moreover, asylum seekers
should not be required to establish that they participate in any practices which
are tangible displays of a commitment to a religion. The central aspect of a
religion is belief in an ideology which involves an element of faith, which is
shared by some other people in the community. In addition to this, religion
often is part of a person’s identity or way of life, but this is not essential in
every case—it can merely be a core belief held by an individual. The concept
of a religious belief is wide-ranging and should include theistic beliefs and
convictions about the divine or spiritual aspect of humankind.
There are numerous ways in which people can establish that religion is a
key aspect of their identity, including by the attire they wear and ceremonies
in which they participate. This means that in order to establish that a person
is a member of a certain religion, it is not necessary for him or her to establish
a deep understanding of the core elements of the religion or tangible conduct
consistent with tenants of the religion. Moreover, religious persecution can
arise where an individual is targeted for not belonging to a religion or because
they are wrongly believed to practice a certain religion.
The reform proposal suggested in this article will have the effect of
widening the scope of this convention ground, thereby facilitating the entry of
more asylum seekers into the United States and indeed other Convention
countries that adopt the proposed definition.
In the next Part of this article, we provide an overview of the current
displaced persons crisis. This is from the international perspective and then
from the perspective of the current situation in the United States. This is
followed by a history of the 1951 Refugee Convention. In Parts IV and V, we
examine the current approach to the refugee convention ground of religion
and propose a coherent and workable definition of this concept. Our reform
proposals are summarized in the concluding remarks.

7. See Elana Schor, Trump Condemns Religious Persecution Amid Refugee Squeeze,
ASSOCIATED PRESS (Sept. 29, 2019), https://apnews.com/9562626425d74765bf89ff91931de0d0.
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II. THE DISPLACED PERSONS CRISIS
A. Overview of the Current Displaced Persons Crisis
The magnitude of the displaced persons phenomenon, in terms of number
and impact, is unprecedented. We are experiencing record levels of forced
displacement. The starkest figures are set out in the most recent annual study
by the refugee agency, the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees
(UNHCR), in its Global Trends Report (UNHCR Report),8 which sets out in
detail the current state of the displaced persons crisis. According to the report,
the world’s forcibly displaced population stood at 70.8 million people in
20189—increasing for the eighth consecutive year.10 This is the highest
number of displaced persons recorded since the agency began collecting data
on displaced persons in 1951.11 It should also be noted that this figure,
according to Filippo Grandi, the United Nations High Commissioner for
Refugees, is a conservative one. For example, the total number of persons
who have been forced to flee the ongoing political crisis in Venezuela is not
yet known—in what has become one of the worst displacement crises in recent
history.12
The displaced persons population is comprised of different cohorts. The
United Nations estimates that there are about 26 million refugees, over 41
million internally displaced persons (that is, within their own countries), and
3.5 million asylum seekers who make up the global total number of displaced
persons.13 Stateless persons are not accounted for in this global total of

8. See GLOBAL TRENDS 2018, supra note 1.
9. Id. at 5.
10. Id.
11. See id.; Press Release, U.N. High Comm’r of Refugees, Worldwide Displacement Tops 70
Million, UN Refugee Chief Urges Greater Solidarity in Response (June 19, 2019),
https://www.unhcr.org/en-us/news/press/2019/6/5d03b22b4/worldwide-displacement-tops-70million-un-refugee-chief-urges-greater-solidarity.html [hereinafter Worldwide] (reporting that 70.8
million is the highest number of displaced persons in the last seventy years since the agency began
collecting data).
12. Nick Cumming-Bruce, Number of People Fleeing Conflict is Highest Since World War II, U.N.
Says, N.Y. TIMES (June 19, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/06/19/world/refugees-recordun.html; see also U.N. HIGH COMM’R OF REFUGEES, VENEZUELA SITUATION: RESPONDING TO THE
NEEDS OF PEOPLE DISPLACED FROM VENEZUELA 46 (Mar. 2018), https://www.
unhcr.org/5ab8e1a17.pdf.
13. GLOBAL TRENDS 2018, supra note 1, at 2.
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displaced persons.14 These are individuals who are not considered a citizen
of any country and thus are denied basic civil and social rights such as access
to education, healthcare, and freedom of movement.15 In 2018, the UNHCR
conservatively estimated that there were at least 10 million stateless persons
worldwide.16
The global population of forcibly displaced people today is larger than
the population of Thailand.17 In fact, if the total global population of forcibly
displaced people today were to be combined to form their own country, it
would be the twentieth most populous country in the world.18
The growth in the population of displaced people over the most recent
decade shows an even more pronounced increase.19 In the ten-year period
from 2009 to 2018 (inclusive) the displaced population increased by 27.5
million people.20 This is an almost 40% increase in a single decade. This
rapid growth in the world’s forcibly displaced population is set out in the
graph below.21

14. See Persons of Concern to UNHCR, U.N. HIGH COMM’R FOR REFUGEES,
https://www.unhcr.org/ph/persons-concern-unhcr (last visited Jan. 20, 2021) (providing the
breakdown of the 70.8 million figure and explaining that stateless people are accounted for separately).
15. Id. (explaining that stateless people are denied nationality, and that ultimately the power to
assign nationality rests with governments).
16. Id.
17. See Worldwide, supra note 11 (describing the number of displaced persons as “correspond[ing]
to a population between that of Thailand and Turkey”).
18. Most Populous Countries in the World (2020), WORLDOMETER, https://www.worldometers.
info/population/most-populous-countries/ (last visited Jan. 20, 2021) (providing the top twenty most
populous countries in the world, with Thailand ranked twentieth at 69.8 million people).
19. See GLOBAL TRENDS 2018, supra note 1, at 4–5 (showing the increase over the past ten years
of forcibly displaced persons).
20. Id. at 4. It was 43.3 million in 2009. Id.
21. Id. at 5.
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Approaching the issue from a somewhat wider lens further illuminates the
extent of the crisis. In 1996, there were 37.3 million displaced people in the
world.22 This is an increase of 33.5 million people in just over twenty years.23
Currently, the largest driver of forced displacement is the Syrian Civil
War, which began in 2011.24 It has resulted in the most profound refugee and
displaced persons problem in the world since World War II (WWII).25 The
UNHCR Report states that Syria recorded the largest population of displaced
persons for the fifth consecutive year with a total of 13 million displaced
Syrians.26 This figure is comprised of 6.7 million refugees, 6.2 million
internally displaced within the borders of Syria (of which 2.5 million are
children), and 140,000 asylum seekers.27 Other countries that registered large
displaced persons populations in 2018 include Colombia (8 million),
Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) (5.4 million), Afghanistan (5.1
million), South Sudan (4.2 million), and Somalia (3.7 million).28
22. See U.N. HIGH COMM’R FOR REFUGEES, GLOBAL TRENDS: FORCED DISPLACEMENT IN 2015,
6 (June 20, 2016), https://www.unhcr.org/576408cd7.pdf.
23. See GLOBAL TRENDS 2018, supra note 1, at 4.
24. See GLOBAL TRENDS 2018, supra note 1, at 3–4 (finding that a large portion of the displaced
person population comes from the Syrian Arab Republic).
25. See Euan McKirdy, UNHCR Report: More Displaced Now Than After WWII, CNN (June 20,
2016, 9:29 AM), https://www.cnn.com/2016/06/20/world/unhcr-displaced-peoples-report/index.
html.
26. GLOBAL TRENDS 2018, supra note 1, at 6, 14.
27. Id. at 6; Internally Displaced People, U.N. HIGH COMM’R FOR REFUGEES,
https://www.unhcr.org/sy/internally-displaced-people (last visited Jan. 20, 2021) (providing the
number of internally displaced children from Syria).
28. GLOBAL TRENDS 2018, supra note 1, at 6–7.
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As noted above, refugees account for a significant proportion of the global
displaced population—there are currently more refugees worldwide than at
any time since WWII.29 These are persons who are fleeing conflict, violence
or persecution. The number of refugees under UNHCR’s mandate increased
for the eighth consecutive year—from 10.5 million in 201030 to a record high
of 20.4 million in 2018.31 To further illustrate the enduring nature of this
crisis, about 80% of these refugees have lived in displacement for five years,
and about one-fifth for twenty years.32 There were an additional 5.5 million
Palestinian refugees registered under the United Nations Relief and Works
Agency’s mandate.33 When combined, the total number of refugees in 2018
stood at 26 million, and according to the UN, only half of one percent will be
resettled.34 The significance of the refugee crisis is further underlined by the
fact that half of the world’s refugees continued to be children.35
B. Unremitting Increase in Numbers of Displaced People
The most recent data regarding displaced persons relates to the 2019
calendar year.36 The trend for this year was consistent with the large increase
in displaced persons in recent years leading up to 2019.37 This is the result of
a rise in general violence, conflicts, and both new and ongoing political
challenges which have seen large scale deterioration in several countries.38
According to UNHCR data, there were 13.6 million people newly displaced
29. See McKirdy, supra note 25 (discussing the high numbers of refugees in comparison to other
points in history).
30. U.N. HIGH COMM’R FOR REFUGEES, Global Trends 2010 3 (2011), https://www.unhcr.
org/4dfa11499.pdf.
31. GLOBAL TRENDS 2018, supra note 1, at 13.
32. Id. at 22.
33. Id. at 4.
34. Press Release, U.N. High Comm’r for Refugees, UNHCR Troubled by Latest U.S. Refugee
Resettlement Cut (Nov. 2, 2019), https://www.unhcr.org/en-us/news/press/2019/11/5dbd87337/
unhcr-troubled-latest-refugee-resettlement-cut.html [hereinafter Troubled].
35. GLOBAL TRENDS 2018, supra note 1, at 61.
36. See generally U.N. HIGH COMM’R FOR REFUGEES, GLOBAL TRENDS: FORCED DISPLACEMENT
IN 2019 (June 18, 2020), https://www.unhcr.org/5ee200e37.pdf.
37. Id. at 8 (reporting 79.5 million displaced people in 2019, nearly double the number from 2010);
GLOBAL TRENDS 2018, supra note 1, at 4 (reporting an increase from 43.3 million displaced people in
2009 to 70.8 million in 2018).
38. See generally GLOBAL TRENDS 2018, supra note 1, at 4; INTERNAL DISPLACEMENT
MONITORING CTR., GLOBAL REPORT ON INTERNAL DISPLACEMENT, (May 2018),
https://www.internal-displacement.org/global-report/grid2018/downloads/2018-GRID.pdf.
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during 2018 alone.39 To put this figure into perspective, that is 37,000 new
displacements each day of the year.
Of the total number of new displacements in 2018, 1.1 million people
were registered as new refugees.40 These are persons who sought protection
outside their country of origin and have either been recognized as a refugee
on a prima facie basis or granted temporary protection following a refugee
status determination. Over half of the newly recognized refugees were
Syrians (520,000), of whom almost 400,000 were located in Turkey.41 There
were an additional 1.7 million new asylum claims submitted in 2018.42
The United States was the world’s largest recipient of individual asylum
applications for the second consecutive year—with 254,300 applications
submitted.43 Peru and Germany received the second and third highest number
of new applications in 2018—192,500 and 161,900, respectively.44
The ongoing displacement of Syrians continued to contribute markedly
on global displacement figures. In 2018 alone, there were 889,400 newly
displaced Syrians; of this total, 632,700 Syrians fled the country to find safety
and the remainder were internally displaced within the country.45 However,
the largest producer of new displacements was Ethiopia, registering 1.6
million newly displaced Ethiopians during the course of 2018.46
A substantial number of new displacements in recent years is also
attributable to the mass exodus of Venezuelans. The deteriorating political
and economic conditions in Venezuela has resulted in a mass exodus of
Venezuelans that is comparable to that experienced by war-ravaged Syria.47
It is estimated that an average of 5,000 Venezuelans left the country each day
in 2018.48 Alarmingly, one million of these displacements occurred in the

39.
40.
41.
42.
43.
44.
45.
46.
47.
48.

GLOBAL TRENDS 2018, supra note 1, at 2, 6.
Id. at 20.
Id.
Id. at 41.
Id. at 42.
Id. at 3.
Id. at 6.
Id.
See id. at 4, 24.
Siegfried Modola, Venezuelan Outflow Continues Unabated, Stands Now at 3.4 Million, U.N.
HIGH COMM’R FOR REFUGEES (Feb. 25, 2019), https://www.unhcr.org/ph/15238-venezuelan-outflowcontinues-unabated-stands-now-at-3-4-million.html; Press Release, International Org. for Migration,
Venezuelan Outflow Continues Unabated, Population Abroad Now Stands at 3.4 Million (Feb. 22,
2019), https://www.iom.int/news/venezuelan-outflow-continues-unabated-population-abroad-now-
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seven months since November 2018.49 More recent data shows that by the
end of 2019, 16% of the total population (that is, 4.6 million Venezuelans)
had fled the country since the country’s humanitarian crisis began four years
ago.50 It is estimated that the total figure could reach 6.5 million by the end
of 2020.51
C. Countries That Have Produced Highest Numbers of Refugees
The top ten refugee-producing countries accounted for a staggering 82%
of the world’s refugees registered under UNHCR’s mandate, which has been
a consistent trend over recent years.52 That is, 16.6 million of the global total
of 20.4 million refugees are under UNHCR’s responsibility.53 Even more
remarkably, about two-thirds of these refugees originate “from just five
countries: Syria, Afghanistan, South Sudan, Myanmar and Somalia.”54
Syria has continued to produce the world’s highest number of refugees
for the fifth consecutive year.55 As noted above, there were 6.7 million Syrian
refugees reported in 2018.56 This is unprecedented in recent history for a
single country and is a significant increase since 2014, when the internally
displaced population was estimated to be 7.6 million, of which about 3.9
million were refugees.57 This is the world’s largest refugee crisis.58
stands-34-million.
49. Press Release, U.N. High Comm’r for Refugees, Refugee and Migrants From Venezuela Top
4 Million: UNHCR and IOM (June 7, 2019), https://www.unhcr.org/en-us/news/press/2019/6/
5cfa2a4a4/refugees-migrants-venezuela-top-4-million-unhcr-iom.html.
50. See Press Release, U.N. High Comm’r for Refugees & International Org. for Migration,
US$1.35 Billion Needed to Help Venezuelan Refugees and Migrants and Host Countries (Nov. 13,
2019),
https://www.unhcr.org/en-au/news/press/2019/11/5dcbd7284/us135-billion-needed-helpvenezuelan-refugees-migrants-host-countries.html.
51. Id.; see also ORG. FOR AM. STATES, OAS WORKING GROUP TO ADDRESS THE REGIONAL
CRISIS CAUSED BY VENEZUELA’S MIGRANT AND REFUGEE FLOWS 20 (2019) http://www.oas.org/
documents/eng/press/OAS-Report-to-Address-the-regional-crisis-caused-by-Venezuelas-migrant.pdf
(predicting “between 7.5 and 8.2 million”).
52. GLOBAL TRENDS 2018, supra note 1, at 14.
53. Id. at 2, 14.
54. Id. at 14.
55. Id.
56. Id. at 3.
57. U.N. HIGH COMM’R FOR REFUGEES, GLOBAL TRENDS: FORCED DISPLACEMENT IN 2014, 13
(June 18, 2015), https://www.unhcr.org/en-au/statistics/country/556725e69/unhcr-global-trends2014.html [hereinafter GLOBAL TRENDS 2014].
58. GLOBAL TRENDS 2018, supra note 1, at 6, 14 (noting Syrians were the largest forcibly
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The second largest group of refugees were Afghans.59 In fact,
Afghanistan was the largest refugee-producing country for more than 30
years, until 2014 when it was surpassed by Syria.60 In 2018, it was estimated
that some 2.7 million Afghans had fled the country in search of international
protection.61 The majority of these refugees (more than 1.4 million) are
located in Pakistan and a further 951,000 in the Islamic Republic of Iran—
combined, these two countries alone have taken on 88% of the total Afghan
refugee population.62
The ongoing civil conflict in South Sudan produced the third largest
refugee group under UNHCR’s mandate, with 2.3 million refugees worldwide
in 2018.63 The remaining top ten refugee-producing countries in 2018 were
Myanmar (1.1 million), Somalia (949,700), Sudan (724,800), DRC (720,300),
Central African Republic (590,900), Eritrea (507,300) and Burundi
(387,900).64
Moreover, 2.1 million protection applications were submitted by asylum
seekers across 158 countries in 2018.65 An asylum seeker is an individual
who has sought asylum protection outside of their country of origin, but their
application has yet to be assessed.66 A considerable proportion of these
applications, 1.7 million, were new applications lodged by individuals for the
first time.67 The largest number of asylum applications were made by
Venezuelans (341,800), with the majority seeking protection in Peru, Brazil,
and the United States.68 Afghans and Syrians lodged the second and third
highest number of asylum claims in 2018, with both groups lodging just over
100,000 claims.69
To further complete the picture regarding countries that have produced
the highest numbers of displaced persons, just ten countries account for 76%

displaced population in the world at the end of 2018).
59. Id. at 14 (“Refugees from Afghanistan were the second largest group by country of origin”).
60. GLOBAL TRENDS 2014, supra note 57, at 13.
61. GLOBAL TRENDS 2018, supra note 1, at 3.
62. Id. at 14.
63. Id. at 3.
64. Id. at 15–17.
65. Id. at 41.
66. Id. at 63.
67. Id.at 41.
68. Id. at 44–45.
69. Id.
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of the world’s internally displaced person (IDP) population.70 As noted above,
IDPs constituted the largest cohort of displaced people in 2018, totaling 41
million.71 Colombia registered the highest number of IDPs due to conflict or
violence within the country—7.8 million.72 Other countries reporting a large
number of internal displacements included Somalia (2.6 million), Ethiopia
(2.6 million), and Yemen (2.1 million).73
D. Developing Nations Disproportionately Absorbing Refugees
The data shows that there is an unremitting trend of poor countries bearing
a disproportionate burden of the refugee intake.74 The incidence of displaced
and refugee persons is heavily concentrated within just a few regions. Nine
of the top ten refugee-hosting countries in 2018 were developing countries,
which combined hosted 84% of the world’s refugees.75 Germany was the only
developed country to feature among the top ten recipients of refugees in
2018.76 Just over half of the one million refugees settled in Germany are of
Syrian origin.77 The top ten refugee-absorbing nations are set out in the table
below.78

70. See id. at 35–38.
71. Id. at 35.
72. Id.
73. Id. at 36–37.
74. Id. at 17 (“Developing regions continued to shoulder a disproportionately large responsibility
for hosting refugees”).
75. Id. at 18.
76. Id. at 17 fig.6.
77. Id. at 18.
78. Id. at 17 fig.6.
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More broadly, the world’s least developed countries (this includes South
Sudan, DRC, and Ethiopia—which each are among the top ten refugeehosting countries) currently host one-third of the global refugee total.79 In
other terms, 6.7 million refugees under the UNHCR’s mandate are located in
the world’s most impoverished countries with unstable political and rule-oflaw institutions.80 The world’s least developed countries account for only
1.25% of global GDP.81 By comparison, only 16% of refugees are hosted by
high-income, developed countries.82
Looking at it from another measure, low-to-middle income countries host
an average of 5.8 refugees per 1,000 of population.83 This is in stark contrast
to the average of 2.7 per 1,000 of population in high-income countries.84
For the fifth consecutive year, Turkey absorbed the largest number of
refugees in 2018, totaling 3.7 million.85 Since 2014, Turkey’s refugee
population has significantly increased by 2.1 million refugees.86 The refugee

79.
80.
81.
82.
83.
84.
85.
86.

Id. at 17, 17 fig.6 (noting the least developed countries host 33% of the world’s refugees).
Id. at 17–18.
Id.
Id. at 2.
Id. at 21.
See Worldwide, supra note 11.
GLOBAL TRENDS 2018, supra note 1, at 3.
GLOBAL TRENDS 2014, supra note 57, at 12 (noting a refugee population in Turkey of 1.6
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population in Turkey is comprised almost exclusively of Syrians (98%)—this
is the largest Syrian refugee intake by any single country.87 Over the course
of 2018 alone, Turkey took in about 400,000 new refugees—and over 100,000
were newborns.88 The second largest country of asylum was Pakistan with a
refugee population of 1.4 million, which was almost exclusively made up of
Afghans.89 Uganda took in the third largest refugee group (1,165,000) as a
result of the conflict in neighboring South Sudan.90 According to UNHCR,
other countries that provided safety for a high number of refugees in 2018
included Sudan, Germany, Islamic Republic of Iran, Lebanon, Bangladesh,
Ethiopia, and Jordan.91 Thus, it is clear from this data that responsibility for
the world’s refugee crisis is overwhelmingly carried by countries with the
least resources to absorb and accommodate the needs of those seeking
refuge.92
The contrast between refugees and asylum seekers is not the source
countries of these respective groups, but rather the destinations where they are
seeking to be located.93 In contrast to the placement of refugees, as outlined
above, asylum seekers are invariably applying for safety in first world,
wealthy countries with the exception of Peru, which experienced a drastic
increase in asylum applications as a result of the crisis in Venezuela. Peru
received the second largest number of claims for asylum in 2018 with 192,500
claims lodged.94 This is compared to 37,800 in 2017 and 4,400 in 2016.95
For the second consecutive year, the U.S. led the world in the number of
new applications submitted in 201896 with approximately 250,000 claims
lodged.97 Consistent with the trend in recent years, about half of these claims
million).
87. GLOBAL TRENDS 2018, supra note 1, at 14, 18.
88. Id. at 18.
89. Id. at 3, 14.
90. Id. at 3, 8 fig.4, 18.
91. Id. at 70–73 tbl.2.
92. Id. at 17–18.
93. See id. at 3, 15 fig.5, 17 fig.6, 43 fig.17, 45 fig.18 (showing similarities between origin
countries of refugees and asylum seekers but contrasting the destination countries these two groups
are fleeing to).
94. Id. at 3.
95. Id. at 42.
96. Id. at 3; see also U.S. DEP’T OF STATE ET AL., PROPOSED REFUGEE ADMISSIONS FOR FISCAL
YEAR 2019, 4–5 (2019) [hereinafter PROPOSED REFUGEE ADMISSIONS], https://www.state.gov/wpcontent/uploads/2018/12/Proposed-Refugee-Admissions-for-Fiscal-Year-2019.pdf
97. GLOBAL TRENDS 2018, supra note 1, at 42.
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were made by applicants from Central America and Mexico, specifically El
Salvador, Guatemala and Venezuela98—areas that are considered some of the
most violent in the world largely due to the ongoing increase in gang-related
violence.99 A total of 94,000 of these asylum applications originated from
these three countries alone.100
Germany continued to receive a high number of asylum claims in 2018,
recording a total of 161,900 claims lodged.101 However, this is a significant
decrease from the 722,400 that were submitted in 2016.102 To further
complete the picture, other countries that registered the largest numbers of
asylum applications in 2018 were France (114,500), Turkey (83,800), Brazil
(80,000), Greece (65,000), Spain (55,700), Canada (55,400), and Italy
(48,900).103
E. U.S. Policy and Practice Relating to Displaced People
The empirical data shows that the world is currently experiencing an
unprecedented problem associated with the forced displacement of people.
Despite this, states have become increasingly reluctant to absorb or increase
their intake of displaced people. This is certainly true of the United States,
which is one of the most common target countries by prospective refugees.
The number of people seeking asylum in the United States is rapidly
increasing, particularly given the recent upheaval in Venezuela and other parts
of Central America. However, this increase in refugee numbers has
paradoxically been met with ongoing, sweeping policy changes to the asylum
and refugee system.
98. Id. at 8; see also Nora Sturm, UNHCR Calls for Urgent Action as Central America Asylum
Claims Soar, U.N. HIGH COMM’R FOR REFUGEES (Apr. 5, 2016), http://www.unhcr.org/enau/news/latest/2016/4/5703ab396/unhcr-calls-urgent-action-central-america-asylum-claims-soar.
html.
99. See Joshua Partlow, Why El Salvador Became the Hemisphere’s Murder Capital, WASH. POST
(Jan. 6, 2016), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/worldviews/wp/2016/01/05/why-el-salvadorbecame-the-hemispheres-murder-capital/?utm_term=.6695dbb3d9b5 (discussion violence and crime
in this region); Amelia Cheatham, Central America’s Turbulent Northern Triangle, COUNCIL ON
FOREIGN RELATIONS (Oct. 1, 2019), https://www.cfr.org/backgrounder/central-americas-turbulentnorthern-triangle.
100. GLOBAL TRENDS 2018, supra note 1, at 42.
101. Id.
102. U.N. HIGH COMM’R FOR REFUGEES, GLOBAL TRENDS: FORCED DISPLACEMENT IN 2016, 1, 3 (
2017), https://www.unhcr.org/5943e8a34.pdf.
103. GLOBAL TRENDS 2018, supra note 1, at 42–43.
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Reshaping U.S. immigration has been a key objective of the Trump
Administration. Since taking office, President Trump has proposed and
implemented a number of wide-ranging immigration policy changes to reduce
access to the United States.104 These changes have largely focused on, in
particular, the refugee and asylum system, making it nearly impossible to
obtain protection in the U.S.105
Perhaps the most aggressive of these changes is the dramatic reductions
to the refugee resettlement program.106 The U.S. government is responsible
for setting a cap on the maximum number of refugees that can be admitted
into the United States in any given fiscal year.107 In fact, the Trump
Administration considered “a virtual shutdown of refugee admissions” by
proposing a reduction in the number of admissions to nearly zero in 2020. 108
Ultimately, on November 1, 2019, President Donald Trump issued a
Presidential Determination setting the fiscal year 2020 refugee ceiling at
18,000.109 This is the lowest ceiling since the creation of the Refugee Program
in 1980, which established the ceiling system.110 It is also “well below the
number of people already waiting in the U.S. resettlement pipeline,” thereby

104. See SARAH PIERCE & JESSICA BOLTER, DISMANTLING AND RECONSTRUCTING THE U.S.
IMMIGRATION SYSTEM: A CATALOG OF CHANGES UNDER THE TRUMP PRESIDENCY 1 (July 2020)
(providing a comprehensive look at President Trump’s sweeping immigration changes since taking
office); see also Zolan Kanno-Youngs & Michael D. Shear, Trump Virtually Cuts Off Refugees as He
Unleashes a Tirade on Immigrants, N.Y. Times (Oct. 1, 2020), https://www.nytimes.
com/2020/10/01/us/politics/trump-refugees.html (describing the new cap on refugee admissions for
fiscal year 2021, which is down to 15,000 from 18,000 in the 2020 fiscal year).
105. See Kanno-Youngs & Shear, supra note 104 (“The 15,000 cap is the latest step in one of the
central aims for Mr. Trump during his first term: to close the United States to immigrants.”).
106. See id. (explaining that though the current cap is only 3,000 less than that of the fiscal year
2020, it is well below the 110,000 slots approved by President Barack Obama in 2016); PIERCE &
BOLTER, supra note 104, at 64.
107. Claire Felter & James McBride, How Does the U.S. Refugee System Work?, COUNCIL ON
FOREIGN RELATIONS, http://www.cfr.org/backgrounder/how-does-us-refugee-system-work (last
updated Oct. 10, 2018) (explaining that the president proposes the cap, which requires congressional
approval, and giving a brief history of the cap on refugees, which “stayed between seventy thousand
and eighty thousand” from 2001 to 2015).
108. Ted Hesson, Trump Officials Pressing to Slash Refugee Admissions to Zero Next Year,
POLITICO (July 18, 2019, 9:04 PM), https://www.politico.com/story/2019/07/18/trump-officialsrefugee-zero-1603503.
109. Presidential Determination on Refugee Admissions for Fiscal Year 2020, supra note 6. For a
discussion of the Trump administration’s proposed cap of 15,000 for fiscal year 2020, see KannoYoungs & Shear, supra note 104.
110. ANDORRA BRUNO, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RL31269, REFUGEE ADMISSIONS AND
RESETTLEMENT POLICY 1, 5 (2018), https://fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/RL31269.pdf.
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effectively putting a stop to bringing new refugees into the United States.111
Unlike past refugee ceilings, which have been guided by regional
allocations, the U.S. State Department has divided the fiscal year 2020 ceiling
amongst “[p]opulation[s] of special humanitarian concern.”112 Under the
ceiling, the U.S. will accept no more than 5,000 refugees claiming religious
persecution.113 This is despite President Trump claiming that “protecting
religious freedom is one of [his] highest priorities.”114 A further 4,000 places
have been allocated to Iraqis who have assisted the U.S. government or who
have other United States connections and 1,500 from the Northern Triangle
countries of Guatemala, El Salvador, and Honduras.115 This leaves only 7,500
places for other legitimate refugees.
This is not the first time the refugee admissions program has been
dramatically reduced. In the first week of his presidency, President Trump
issued an executive order reducing the 2017 ceiling from 110,000—which had
been set by President Obama only a few months earlier—down to 50,000.116
The refugee ceilings were again reduced in 2018 and 2019 to 45,000117 and
30,000, respectively118 (each of these ceilings was a new low at the time).
It is important to emphasize that these ceilings are simply targets; there is
no obligation on the United States to meet them. For example, in fiscal year
2018, actual refugee admissions totaled 22,491.119 This is currently the lowest
number of admissions in United States history, and is lower than the 27,131
admissions in fiscal year 2002 after the U.S. largely suspended admissions

111. Troubled, supra note 34.
112. U.S. DEP’T OF STATE, REPORT TO CONGRESS ON PROPOSED REFUGEE ADMISSIONS FOR
FISCAL YEAR 2020 (2020), https://www.state.gov/reports/report-to-congress-on-proposed-refugeeadmissions-for-fy-2020/ (last visited Jan. 20, 2021) [hereinafter PROPOSED REFUGEE ADMISSIONS
2020].
113. Presidential Determination on Refugee Admissions for Fiscal Year 2020, supra note 6 (stating
that 5,000 slots apply to people who “have been persecuted or have a well-founded fear of persecution
on account of religion”).
114. Remarks by President Trump at the United Nations Event on Religious Freedom, WHITE
HOUSE (Sept. 23, 2019, 11:47 AM), https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefings-statements/remarkspresident-trump-united-nations-event-religious-freedom-new-york-ny/.
115. Presidential Determination on Refugee Admissions for Fiscal Year 2020, supra note 6.
116. See Exec. Order No. 13,780, 3 C.F.R. § 201 (2018).
117. Presidential Determination No. 2017-13, 3 C.F.R. 488 (Oct. 23, 2018).
118. Presidential Determination No. 2019-01, 83 Fed. Reg. 55,091 (Oct. 4, 2018),
119. Nayla Rush, Refugee Resettlement Roundup for FY 2019, CTR. FOR IMMIGRATION STUDIES
(Oct. 4, 2019), https://cis.org/Rush/Refugee-Resettlement-Roundup-FY-2019.
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following the events of September 11, 2001.120 In 2019, actual refugee
admissions reached the 30,000 ceiling on the last day of the fiscal year.121
From January 20, 2017 to September 30, 2019, the United States, under
the Trump administration, admitted just over 76,000 refugees.122 This is in
stark contrast to the almost 85,000 refugees who were admitted during the
course of 2016 alone, the last full year under President Obama.123 The rapid
decline in both the refugee ceiling and admissions in recent years is shown in
the graph below124:

120. Id.
121. Id.
122. Jens Manuel Krogstad, Key Facts About Refugees to the U.S., PEW RESEARCH CTR. (Oct. 7,
2019), https://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2019/10/07/key-facts-about-refugees-to-the-u-s/.
123. Id.
124. Id.
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As noted above, the annual refugee cap is currently at its lowest level
since the beginning of the refugee resettlement program.125 The White House
has largely attempted to justify the decision to cut the fiscal year 2020 ceiling
to just 18,000 on the basis that priority needs to be given to the separate
asylum system.126
For clarity, the United States offers both refugee and asylum status. Both
refugees and asylum seekers seek asylum in the U.S. under the same
standards; however, the major difference lies in where these persons are at the
time of seeking protection.127 Refugees seek protection from abroad and do
not enter the United States until they have legal permission to do so.128 In
contrast, asylum seekers apply from within the U.S. or when arriving at a
border, without first having legal permission to enter the country.129
According to the State Department, “the current burdens on the U.S.
immigration system must be alleviated before it is again possible to resettle
[a] large number of refugees.”130 The U.S. State Department further estimates
that 350,000 asylum seekers will arrive over the 2020 fiscal year.131
In January 2017, when President Trump took office, there were just over
540,000 cases pending.132 Today, there are over 1 million cases waiting to be
processed.133 To further illuminate the extent to which this backlog has
grown, in 2014, there were only 40,000 cases in the asylum backlog.134
Although this backlog predates the Trump presidency, the number of pending

125. See Kanno-Youngs & Shear, supra note 104 (noting that the 18,000 cap in fiscal year 2020 is
a record low).
126. PROPOSED REFUGEE ADMISSIONS 2020, supra note 112.
127. See Felter & McBride, supra note 107 (explaining the distinction between refugees and asylum
seekers under United States law).
128. Id.
129. Id.
130. Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of State, Report to Congress on Proposed Refugee Admissions for
FY 2020 (Sept. 26, 2019); see PROPOSED REFUGEE ADMISSIONS 2020, supra note 112.
131. Id.
132. See Immigration Court Backlog Tool, TRAC IMMIGRATION (2020), https://trac.syr.edu/
phptools/immigration/court_backlog/; see also Hackman, supra note 5.
133. Immigration Court Backlog Tool, supra note 132; see also Immigration Court’s Active Backlog
Surpasses One Million, TRAC IMMIGRATION. (Sept. 18, 2019), https://trac.syr.edu/
immigration/reports/574/.
134. CHERI ATTIX, AM. IMMIGRATION LAW. ASS’N, THE AFFIRMATIVE ASYLUM BACKLOG
EXPLAINED 1 (Apr. 2, 2014), https://www.immigrantjustice.org/sites/immigrantjustice.org/files/
AILA_Explanation%20of%20the%20Affirmative%20Asylum%20Backlog_4.2.14.pdf.
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cases has risen at a record pace during his presidency.135 For example, the
Trump administration significantly slowed the asylum process when it
directed immigration authorities to reopen thousands of nonviolent (lowlevel) removal cases.136 This backlog, coupled with increased security
screening, has undoubtedly led to significant delays in the grant of asylum,
with the average asylum application taking 578 days to complete.137
This backlog of asylum applications has also had a significant effect on
the number of refugees resettled into the United States. Because of the
backlog and sheer number of asylum applications submitted, the Department
of Homeland Security, in fiscal years 2017 and 2018, shifted a large number
of immigration officers to conduct affirmative asylum processing, which
decreased the number of refugee interviews that could be conducted.138 It
should also be noted that in 2017, the Trump administration implemented
measures to begin “implementing program enhancements to raise the bar for
vetting and screening procedures,”139 which has also led to unduly long
processing times—with the average refugee application taking up to two years
to complete in the United States.140 This is despite the fact the refugee vetting
process in the United States was already considered to be among the most
extensive in the world.
In another step in his administration’s aggressive drive to reshape the U.S.
refugee program, President Trump signed an executive order in September
135. Immigration Court Backlog Tool, supra note 132; see also Hackman, supra note 5.
136. See Zolan Kanno-Youngs & Caitlin Dickerson, Asylum Seekers Face New Restraints Under
Latest Trump Orders, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 29, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/04/29/us/
politics/trump-asylum.html?module=inline; Jie Zong & Jeanne Batalova, Refugees and Asylees in the
United States, MIGRATION POL’Y INST. (June 7, 2017), https://www.migrationpolicy.org/
article/refugees-and-asylees-united-states-6.
137. Denise Lu & Derek Watkins, Court Backlog May Prove Bigger Barrier for Migrants Than
Any Wall, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 24, 2019),
https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2019/01/24/
us/migrants-border-immigration-court.html?mtrref; see also PROPOSED REFUGEE ADMISSIONS, supra
note 96, at 6.
138. See PROPOSED REFUGEE ADMISSIONS, supra note 96, at 5–6.
139. Improved Security Procedures for Refugees Entering the United States, U.S. DEP’T
HOMELAND SECURITY (Oct. 24, 2017), https://www.dhs.gov/news/2017/10/24/improved-securityprocedures-refugees-entering-united-states; see also Presidential Proclamation Enhancing Vetting
Capabilities and Processes for Detecting Attempted Entry Into the United States by Terrorists or Other
Public-Safety Threats, WHITE HOUSE (Sept. 24, 2017), https://www.whitehouse.gov/
presidential-actions/presidential-proclamation-enhancing-vetting-capabilities-processes-detectingattempted-entry-united-states-terrorists-public-safety-threats/.
140. Fact Sheet: U.S. Refugee Resettlement, NAT’L IMMIGRATION FORUM (Sept. 28, 2020),
https://immigrationforum.org/article/fact-sheet-u-s-refugee-resettlement/.
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2019, which requires state and local governments to “consent” to accept
refugees.141 Up until this point, refugees had been resettled throughout the
United States. For example, in fiscal year 2019, refugees were resettled in all
states (except Wyoming and Hawaii) and the District of Columbia.142
Noteworthily, a quarter of all refugees admitted in 2019 (8,100) were resettled
in just four states: Texas, Washington, New York, and California.143
However, under the Executive Order, states have now been given power to
effectively refuse to accept refugees. Not only may this drive discriminatory
and unfair actions against refugees, but it is likely to mean that actual refugee
admissions will not meet the 18,000 cap set for fiscal year 2020.
Under the Trump administration, there has also been a profound shift in
not only the number of refugees admitted, but also in who is admitted into the
United States.144 Although refugee admissions have fallen from most
countries since 2016, those from the Middle East have been most affected.145
This decline is largely driven by a much-litigated travel ban implemented by
President Trump.146
In January 2017, just a week into his tenure, Trump signed an immigration
Executive Order that attempted to implement an indefinite ban of Syrian
refugees.147 However, after a series of court challenges,148 a “watered down”
order was issued in March 2017.149 This Order was also the subject of legal

141. See Exec. Order No. 13,888, 84 Fed. Reg. 52,355 (Sept. 26, 2019); Mark Greenberg, Julia
Gelatt & Amy Holovina, As the United States Resettles Fewer Refugees, Some Countries and
Religions Face Bigger Hits than Others, MIGRATION POL’Y INST., https://www.migrationpolicy.
org/news/united-states-refugee-resettlement-some-countries-religions-face-bigger-hits (last updated
Oct. 17, 2019).
142. Krogstad, supra note 122.
143. Id.
144. Krogstad, supra note 122 (noting the fluctuations in refugee admissions over the past thirty
years, as well as the marked shift in the percentages of Muslim and Christian refugees admitted in
fiscal year 2016 (46% of refugees were Muslim) and fiscal year 2019 (79% of refugees were
Christian)).
145. Id.
146. Id.
147. See Exec. Order No. 13,769, 82 Fed. Reg. 8977 (Jan. 27, 2017).
148. See Adam Liptak, Court Refuses to Reinstate Travel Ban, Dealing Trump Another Legal Loss,
N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 9, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/02/09/us/politics/appeals-court-trumptravel-ban.html.
149. See Exec. Order No. 13,780, 3 C.F.R. 390 (2018).
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challenges;150 however, the Supreme Court allowed it to take effect in part.151
Under the Executive Order, the Trump administration was allowed to
implement a 120-day suspension, which took effect in late June 2017, of all
refugee arrivals152 and a ninety-day ban of all citizens from six Muslimmajority countries (including Syria).153 This is commonly referred to as the
“Trump travel ban.”154
Although the refugee program resumed in October 2017,155 citizens of
eleven “high-risk” countries continued to be barred from entry into the United
States for a further ninety day review.156 The countries—many, but not all,
Muslim majority—were Egypt, Iran, Iraq, Libya, Mali, North Korea, Somalia,
South Sudan, Sudan, Syria, and Yemen.157 When admissions resumed for
these refugees in January 2018, they did so with “enhance[ed] security vetting
[procedures].”158 It is clear from recent admission statistics that these largely
unspecified increased security procedures acted as an additional barrier for
legitimate prospective refugees to find sanctuary.159 Between 2016 and 2019,
refugee admissions from these eleven high-risk countries fell by 95%.160 In
2019, only 1,851 refugees were resettled from these countries.161
150. See Alexander Burns, 2 Federal Judges Rule Against Trump’s Latest Travel Ban, N.Y. TIMES
(Mar. 15, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/03/15/us/politics/trump-travel-ban.html.
151. Robert Barnes & Matt Zapotosky, Supreme Court Allows Limited Version of Trump’s Travel
Ban To Take Effect and Will Consider Case in Fall, WASH. POST (June 26, 2017),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/courts_law/supreme-court-allows-limited-version-oftrumps-travel-ban-to-take-effect-will-consider-case-in-fall/2017/06/26/97afa314-573e-11e7-b38e35fd8e0c288f_story.html.
152. Id.
153. Id.
154. Id.; see also Michael D. Shear & Helene Cooper, Trump Bars Refugees and Citizens of 7
Muslim Countries, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 27, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/01/27/us/
politics/trump-syrian-refugees.html.
155. Exec. Order No. 13,815, 3 C.F.R. 390 (2018).
156. Peter Baker & Adam Liptak, U.S. Resumes Taking in Refugees, but 11 Countries Face More
Review, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 24, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/10/24/us/politics/trump-liftsrefugee-suspension.html; see Yeganeh Torbati, U.S. To Resume Refugee Admissions From 11 “HighRisk” Countries, REUTERS (Jan. 29, 2018 9:17 AM), https://www.reuters.com/article/us-usaimmigration-refugees/u-s-to-resume-refugee-admissions-from-11-high-risk-countriesidUSKBN1FI27F (discussing resumption of refugee admissions).
157. See Miriam Jordan, New Scrutiny Coming for Refugees From 11 “High-Risk” Nations, N.Y.
TIMES (Jan. 29, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/01/29/us/muslim-refugees-trump.html.
158. PROPOSED REFUGEE ADMISSIONS, supra note 96, at 6. See also Jordan, supra note 157.
159. Greenberg, Gelatt & Holovina, supra note 141.
160. Id.
161. Rush, supra note 119.
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In September 2017, President Trump signed a third version of the travel
ban, which in a 5–4 decision, the Supreme Court allowed to be implemented
in full.162 As the travel ban stands today, all citizens from five predominately
Muslim countries are effectively banned from traveling to the United States.163
The order also targets certain travelers from North Korea and Venezuela, but
to a lesser extent.164 Unlike earlier iterations, this ban is not temporary.
Taken together, the travel ban and heightened security vetting
detrimentally impact the admission of Muslims. State Department data
confirms that the number of Muslim refugee admissions fell 86% since fiscal
year 2016—from 38,900165 to 4,900 in 2019.166 There has also been a 37%
decline in Christian admissions during this period—from 35,210167 to
23,754.168 This pattern marks a sharp reversal from several years ago. In
2016, Muslim refugees accounted for 46%169 of all refugees admitted in the
year—in 2019, this was only 16.5%.170 The biggest decline in refugee
admissions since 2016 is attributable to “Syria (from 12,587 to 563), Iraq
(from 9,880 to 465) and Somalia (from 9,020 to 231)”—all of which are
Muslim majority countries.171
As a presidential candidate, Donald Trump called for “a total and
complete shutdown” of Muslims entering the United States.172 Despite
162. See Adam Liptak & Michael D. Shear, Trump’s Travel Ban Is Upheld by Supreme Court, N.Y.
TIMES (June 26, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/06/26/us/politics/supreme-court-trumptravel-ban.html.
163. See generally Proclamation No. 9645, 82 Fed. Reg. 45, 161 (Sept. 24, 2017) (noting that the
Secretary of Homeland Security recommends restrictions and limitations on entry from Chad, Iran,
Libya, North Korea, Syria, Venezuela, and Yemen—only North Korea and Venezuela’s predominant
religions are not Islam).
164. See generally id. (showing that the practical effect on North Korean and Venezuelan citizens
is limited).
165. FY 2016 Refugee Resettlement Admissions Under the Obama Administration, CTR. FOR
IMMIGRATION STUDIES (Oct. 1, 2018), https://cis.org/sites/default/files/2018-10/2016-refugeeadmissions.pdf.
166. Abby Budiman, Key Findings About U.S. Immigrants, PEW RESEARCH CTR. (Aug. 20, 2020),
https://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2020/08/20/key-findings-about-u-s-immigrants/.
167. FY 2016 Refugee Resettlement Admissions Under the Obama Administration, supra note 165.
168. Rush, supra note 119.
169. FY 2016 Refugee Resettlement Admissions Under the Obama Administration, supra note 165.
170. Rush, supra note 119.
171. Greenberg, Gelatt & Holovina, supra note 141.
172. Jenna Johnson, Trump Calls for “Total and Complete Shutdown of Muslims Entering the
United States,” WASH. POST (Dec. 7, 2015 7:43PM), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/postpolitics/wp/2015/12/07/donald-trump-calls-for-total-and-complete-shutdown-of-muslims-entering-
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retreating on this promise, it is clear from the above that he was successful in
imposing a Muslim ban.
III. HISTORY OF THE REFUGEE CONVENTION AND THE DEVELOPMENT OF
REFUGEE DEFINITION
The beginning of international refugee protection took the form of
numerous ad hoc inter-governmental agreements and treaties, formulated
under the League of Nations in the aftermath of WWII.173 Although there is
a history of human displacement before this time, it was the refugee groups
that emerged during the inter-war period who first attracted the attention of
the international community.174 These European refugee groups differed
significantly from earlier ones due to their size and the immense difficulty and
often impossibility of finding a new home.175
These documents were created in response to specific events that
triggered significant refugee movements in an attempt to provide some
measure of protection to the affected refugees.176 Importantly, they
demonstrated an awareness by governments of the international nature of the
refugee problem and established the rules, principles, and definitions that
underpinned the beginnings of international legal refugee protection, and
would go on to shape the modern era of refugee law in the form of the 1951
Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees.177 In the next part of this
article, we provide a brief review of a number of these instruments,
specifically those which contributed to the development of the definition of a
“refugee.”
The League of Nations was an international, inter-governmental
organization established in 1919178 with the primary purpose “to promote

the-united-states/.
173. See An Introduction to the International Protection of Refugees, REFWORLD (June 1992),
https://www.refworld.org/pdfid/3cce9a244.pdf.
174. See generally CLAUDENA M. SKRAN, REFUGEES IN INTER-WAR EUROPE ch. 2 (1995)
(describing the origins and dimensions of the major refugee groups of the inter-war years).
175. See generally id. at 14.
176. See generally id. at 101; JAMES C. HATHAWAY, THE RIGHTS OF REFUGEES UNDER
INTERNATIONAL LAW 86, 88 (2005) (reviewing the history, impact, and legal rights granted to
refugees by the 1933 Convention).
177. See generally 1951 Refugee Convention, supra note 2.
178. See League of Nations, Covenant of the League of Nations, REFWORLD (Apr. 28, 1919),
http://www.refworld.org/docid/3dd8b9854.html.
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international co-operation and to achieve international peace and security”
between countries in the aftermath of World War I (WWI).179 The League
provided a forum for its members to discuss and deal with a variety of social
and political problems, including refugee issues.180
In 1921, the League appointed Dr. Fridtjof Nansen as the first “High
Commissioner on behalf of the League in connection with the problems of
Russian refugees in Europe.”181 The High Commissioner’s mandate included
securing the assistance and defining the legal status of Russian refugees.182 It
has been estimated that at this time, there were at least 1.5 million Russians
who had been displaced from their homes and scattered throughout Europe
following the breakdown of the Russian Empire.183 Thus, this was the most
pronounced refugee movement during the inter-war era and the first to attract
and receive the attention of the international community.184
Although, as noted above, the notion of people being forcibly displaced
from their homes and needing safety existed prior to this time, refugee law
was virtually non-existent.185 The absence of legal rules concerning the
treatment or legal protection of refugees or obligations on states to assist or
take in displaced people created challenges in dealing with the mass exodus
of Russian refugees.186
Perhaps the most significant challenge was that the mass displacement of
Russians coincided with the abrupt end of relatively free international
movement of the nineteenth century accorded to refugees during the

179. Id.
180. See Claudena M. Skran, Profiles of the First Two High Commissioners, 1 J. REFUGEE STUD.
277, 277 (1988) (giving a historical overview of the creation of the League of Nations).
181. COLIN HARVEY, SEEKING ASYLUM IN THE UK: PROBLEMS AND PROSPECTS 15 (Butterworths
2000) (defining Nansen’s role as High Commissioner).
182. James C. Hathaway, The Evolution of Refugee Status in International Law: 1920–1950, 33
INT’L. & COMP. L.Q. 348, 348, 351 (1984).
183. SKRAN, supra note 174, at 33. However, it is noteworthy that estimates in relation to this vary
significantly. See DANIÈLE JOLY ET. AL., REFUGEES IN EUROPE: THE HOSTILE NEW AGENDA 5
(1990); EVAN MAWDSLEY, THE RUSSIAN CIVIL WAR (1987); JOHN C. TORPEY, THE INVENTION OF
THE PASSPORT: SURVEILLANCE, CITIZENSHIP & THE STATE (2000); see generally SKRAN, supra note
174, at 32–40 (detailing the mass Russian refugee movements during the inter-war years).
184. See SKRAN, supra note 174, at 84–88; see also Alessandra Roversi, The Evolution of the
Refugee Regime and Institutional Responses: Legacies from the Nansen Period, 22 REFUGEE SURV.
Q. 21, 23 (2003).
185. ATLE GRAHL-MADSEN, THE STATUS OF REFUGEES IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 9 (1966).
186. SKRAN, supra note 174, at 101–02.
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nineteenth century.187 Following the conclusion of WWI, governments
rapidly began to implement restrictive immigration policies in an attempt to
tighten their borders and control the movements of refugees.188 These
movement restrictions had, in fact, begun in the United States with the
enactment of the 1921 and 1924 Immigration Acts.189 These laws were a sharp
departure from existing policy by restrictions imposed not only on the first
numerical cap on the number of persons that the United States would accept,
but also limits based on ethnicity.190
Part of the stricter immigration controls was the increased regulation by
governments that all international travelers carry a passport.191 This was not
possible for many of the displaced Russians who had been rendered stateless,
thereby deprived of their citizenship, and therefore could not return home.192
Thus, unlike past refugee groups, it was clear this was not a temporary
displacement problem.
Even in the event that such refugees could find a temporary place of
safety, “they lived as aliens in foreign lands, often with an insecure legal status
and subject to expulsion at a moment’s notice.”193 Host governments became
increasingly reluctant to naturalize or take on financial obligations for
refugees, making it difficult for them to integrate fully.194
In order to address these problems, specifically the ambiguous legal status
and restricted ability to travel to other countries to find asylum, Nansen
proposed internationally recognized identification certificates to be issued to
Russian refugees.195 This travel certificate—which became known as the

187. See Hathaway, supra note 182, at 348–49.
188. See id at 348; see also SKRAN, supra note 174, at 21–30; Louise W. Holborn, The Legal Status
of Political Refugees, 1920–1938, 32 AM. J. INT’L. L. 680, 681, 682 (1938).
189. D’Vera Cohn, How U.S. Immigration Laws and Rules Have Changed Through History, PEW
RESEARCH CTR. (Sept. 30, 2015), https:/www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2015/09/30/how-u-simmigration-laws-and-rules-have-changed-through-history/ (examining the history of immigration
laws in the United States).
190. See SKRAN, supra note 174, at 22 (providing more details and specific numbers). Other
countries such as Britain, Australia, and Canada followed the United States in implementing tighter
immigration controls. See id. at 24.
191. Id. at 22.
192. Hathaway, supra note 182, at 351.
193. SKRAN, supra note 174, at 38.
194. Id.
195. Hathaway, supra note 182, at 342. For a detailed overview of the Nansen passport system, see
id. See also SKRAN, supra note 174, at 101–12.
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“Nansen Passport”196—was subsequently adopted under the Arrangement
with Regard to the Issue of Certificates of Identity to Russian Refugees (“1922
Arrangement”).197 Although this was a non-binding agreement, it was
generally well-received by governments.198
Under the Nansen Passport system, governments could issue legal
identity certificates to Russian refugees living within their borders.199 The
certificates were valid for one year (however, there was provision for them to
be renewed), confirming that the stated bearer was a Russian national by
origin, and became invalid if the bearer adopted another nationality.200
Although the certificates were not equivalent to a national passport in that they
did not grant citizenship rights or provide the right to return to the country of
issue (unless there was an express permission within), they did give refugees
who were effectively stateless somewhat of a recognizable legal identity, and
allowed them to cross national borders and travel internationally more freely
(and legally) in an attempt to resettle.201
The Nansen Passport system marked the beginning of international
refugee law and went on to “serve as the foundation of a clearly defined legal
status for refugees.”202 Throughout the following two decades, the League of
Nations expanded this system of legal protection on an ad hoc basis to assist
and protect other large and diverse groups of refugees in similar circumstances
to the Russians and bring them under “refugee” status. For example, the
Nansen system was expanded to include Armenian,203 Assyrian, Assyro-

196. See generally Hathaway, supra note 182.
197. Arrangement with Regard to the Issue of Certificates of Identity to Russian Refugees, July 5,
1922, 355 L.N.T.S. 238 [hereinafter 1922 Arrangement].
198. Hathaway, supra note 182, at 348; see also SKRAN, supra note 174, at 106–07.
199. See Holborn, supra note 188, at 684 (“Within its limits, [the Nansen Passport] was an identity
paper of international validity for Russian refugees, intended as a substitute for a national passport”).
200. Id. at 684.
201. SKRAN, supra note 174; see also Holborn, supra note 188, at 680, 684.
202. Russian Refugees: Report by Dr. Nansen, High Commissioner of the League of Nations,
League of Nations, Doc. L.N.O.J. 1922, at 927 (July 20, 1922); see also LOUISE W. HOLBORN,
REFUGEES: A PROBLEM OF OUR TIME 9 (1975) (“For any long-range and permanent solution, the
primary need of the refugees is a legal status that will give them standing in the country of refuge and
thus permit employment or enable them to travel from one country to another in search of opportunities
elsewhere.”); SKRAN, supra note 174, at 106; Hathaway, supra note 182, at 350–51 (examining the
development of the Nansen passports into legal rights for Russian refugees).
203. See League of Nations, Plan for the Issue of a Certificate of Identity to Armenian Refugees, 5
L.N.O.J. 969–70 (May 31, 1924).

605

[Vol. 48: 577, 2021]

What It Means to Be a Religious Refugee
PEPPERDINE LAW REVIEW

Chaldean, Syrian, Kurdish, and Turkish displaced groups.204
Although at first relatively limited, the scope and legal protections
afforded by the Nansen Passports grew more comprehensive. For example,
the 12 May 1926 Arrangement Relating to the Issue of a Certificate of Identity
to Armenian Refugees (1926 Arrangement)205 significantly improved the
1922 Arrangement by recommending that the certificates make provision for
a return visa if the holder departed the country. Thus, governments would
undertake to re-admit the holder to the country of issue in an effort to enable
the “freedom of movement of the refugees.”206 As a result, the identity
certificates increasingly became accepted as de facto “passports.”207 Over
time, the League also attempted to confer a range of rights to refugees—this
included the recognition of the refugees’ personal status, including divorce
and marriage rights, and contained other favorable treatment including rights
to work, protection against expulsion, and equality in taxation.208 Notably, as
the agreements grew more comprehensive, the number of signatory states
declined significantly.209
The 1926 Arrangement is also noteworthy for another reason; that is, it
was the first international legal instrument to expressly define a refugee. In
the earlier documents, identity certificates could be issued to ‘‘Russian” or
“Armenian” refugees, without any further elaboration.210 Under the 1926
Arrangement, a refugee was from a specified ethnic group who had been
deprived of the protection by the government in the refugee’s country of

204. Arrangement Concerning the Extension to Other Categories of Refugee of Certain Measures
Taken in Favour of Russian and Armenian Refugees, June 30, 1928, 89 L.N.T.S. 65. It should also
be noted that although the Nansen passport system was not extended to include German refugees from
the Third Reich in the 1930s, a similar system was introduced for these refugees under the
Arrangement Concerning the Status of Refugees Coming From Germany (1936 Provisional
Arrangement) and the 1938 Convention Concerning the Status of Refugees Coming From Germany.
For a detailed discussion of these documents, see SKRAN, supra note 174, at chs. 5–7.
205. Arrangement Relating to the Issue of Identity Certificates to Russian and Armenian Refugees,
May 12, 1926, 2004 L.N.T.S. 48 (1926) [hereinafter 1926 Arrangement].
206. Id. at provision 3.
207. See Holborn, supra note 188, at 685–86.
208. See, e.g., Arrangement Concerning the Extension to Other Categories of Refugee of Certain
Measures Taken in Favour of Russian and Armenian Refugees, supra note 204. Notably, the
arrangements prior to 1928 did not establish any “specific responsibilities for states other than cooperation in the recognition of League of Nations documentation.” See HATHAWAY, supra note 176,
at 86.
209. See also SKRAN, supra note 174, at 105–07.
210. See 1922 Arrangement, supra note 197; 1926 Arrangement, supra note 205.

606

[Vol. 48: 577, 2021]

What It Means to Be a Religious Refugee
PEPPERDINE LAW REVIEW

origin and had not acquired another nationality.211 This definition had been
proposed by the High Commissioner.212
By the 1930s, governments were experiencing high levels of political and
economic instability owing to the economic depression and the rise of
fascism. Not only did governments begin enforcing laws that were
unfavorable to refugees, particularly dealing with limits on foreign workers,213
but they also became increasingly unwilling to accept many of the defined
categories of refugees under the arrangements.214
Thus, it was clear that these agreements, which lacked the binding legal
status of treaty law, were no longer a tenable solution to deal with the ongoing
mass movements of refugees. As noted in a Secretariat memorandum, “with
the exception of the Nansen passport, the existing so-called arrangements are
producing practically no effect upon the position of the refugees.”215 This was
largely because the agreements were recommendations only to signatory
states, and, ultimately, reliance on goodwill to deal with the mass population
flows was insufficient.
In order to secure a more permanent and stable solution to the protection
of refugees, the League of Nations formally called for a refugee convention,
and a draft was submitted at an intergovernmental conference in Geneva in
1933.216 The 1933 Convention Relating to the International Status of
Refugees (1933 Convention)217 represents the first attempt to create a
comprehensive legal framework for refugees with a convention basis.
The 1933 Convention, which came into force in 1935,218 guaranteed
211. 1926 Arrangement, supra note 205.
212. See Hathaway, supra note 182, at 353 (citing REPORT BY THE HIGH COMMISSIONER LEAGUE
OF NATIONS Doc. 1926.XLII.2, at 11 (1926)).
213. HATHAWAY, supra note 176, at 86–87 (discussing the instability of different governments’
granting of legal status to refugees); see also SKRAN, supra note 174, at 123–24.
214. See Russian, Armenian, Assyrian, Assyro-Chaldean and Turkish Refugees: Report of the
Advisory Commission to the High Commissioner for Refugees, Submitted to the Council on June 12th,
1929, 10 LEAGUE OF NATIONS O.J. 1035, 1077–80 (discussing the impossibility of accepting the
defined categories of refugees under previous arrangements).
215. Secretariat memorandum of Feb. 3, 1933, League of Nations Doc. L.N.A, R5614/686; see also
SKRAN, supra note 174, at 124.
216. See SKRAN, supra note 174, at 124; see also Work of the Inter-governmental Advisory
Commission for Refugees During its Fifth Session and Communication from the International Nansen
Office for Refugees, 5(1) L.N.O.J. 854 (1933), at 855 (as cited by HATHAWAY, supra note 176, at 87).
217. Convention Relating to the International Status of Refugees, Oct. 28, 1933, 159 L.N.T.S. 199
[hereinafter 1933 Convention].
218. Id.
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refugees a broad range of basic civil, political, and economic rights. These
included rights in respect of identity certificates, education, labor conditions,
taxation, expulsion, social welfare, and access to courts.219 However, drafters
seemed to be merely consolidating earlier practices under the earlier
arrangements, as many of these rights guaranteed in the 1933 Convention
simply formalized or enhanced those in the 1926 Arrangement.220 For
signatory states, the provisions of the 1933 Convention were legally binding
and not recommendations for action.
Moreover, there was an emphasis on promoting the principle of equal
treatment of refugees by governments. Notably, as highlighted by Hathaway,
“the 1933 onvention guaranteed almost all refugee rights either absolutely or
on terms of equivalency with the citizens of most-favored states.”221
Importantly, the 1933 Convention was the first instrument to set a binding
obligation on signatory states in relation to expulsion and the non-refoulement
of refugees,222 which became an increasingly common practice during the
1930s.223 This principle means that governments should not expel or
involuntarily return a refugee to not only their country of origin, but any
country against their will if there is a risk of persecution—this includes the
refusal to admit someone at the frontier. The right to non-refoulement is
considered to be fundamental to modern international refugee law.
As for its applicability, the 1933 Convention covered Russian, Armenian,
Assyrian, Assyro-Chaldean, and Turkish refugees.224 This convention
continued the practice of defining refugees according to a certain ethnic
background.225 Under this definition, it was also still necessary that the
219. Id. For a detailed discussion on the rights and standards set out under the 1933 Convention,
see SKRAN, supra note 174, at 125–29; HATHAWAY, supra note 176, at 87–88.
220. HATHAWAY, supra note 176, at 88.
221. Id.
222. 1933 Convention, supra note 217, at 3–4. Although the obligation not to expel and to avoid
refoulement of Armenian and Russian refugees was first set out in the 1926 Arrangement Relating to
the Legal Status of Russian and Armenian Refugees, this obligation was in the form of non-binding
recommendations. See Arrangement Concerning the Extension to Other Categories of Refugee of
Certain Measures Taken in Favour of Russian and Armenian Refugees supra note 204; see also
SKRAN, supra note 174, at 131.
223. Nansen International Office for Refugees: Discussing the Governing Body’s Report, 109
LEAGUE OF NATIONS O.J., Spec. Suppl. 14, 16–17 (1932).
224. 1933 Convention, supra note 217, at 3. Article I of the 1933 Convention states that it is
applicable to “Russian, Armenian, and assimilated refugees, as defined by the Arrangements of May
12th, 1926, and June 30th, 1928.” Id.
225. Id.
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refugee was deprived of the “protection” by the government in their country
of origin and had not acquired another nationality.226
By adopting the narrow definition first set out in the 1926 Arrangement,
this greatly limited the ambit of protection provided for in the 1933
Convention.227 It also gave emphasis to the point that the 1933 Convention
was intended to deal with those refugees who already fell under the protection
of the League of Nations—specifically the Nansen International Office, which
had been set up in 1930 following the death of the High Commissioner—and
that “its purpose was not to aid refugees in a broader sense.”228
Although this narrow definition was criticized, particularly for the lack of
scope and emphasis on a lack of diplomatic protection in the definition,229
there were benefits. As explained by Skran,
from a purely practical point [of] view, [the definition] provided a
relatively efficient way of dealing with a mass exodus. Interviewing
several million people individually to see if [they] qualified as
refugees under one specific definition was unnecessary; instead,
refugee assistance could simply be extended to all members of a
particular movement.230
Further, there was no requirement on refugees to “prove that they left their
home countries because of persecution or some other specific reason. Instead,
the group designation gave refugee status to people who fled a variety of lifethreatening situations.”231 This approach was also advantageous for
governments because it allowed them “to limit their commitments to known
categories and stay[] away from any general description of unknown
quantity.”232
Ultimately, only eight states formally ratified and applied the provisions
of the treaty; however, many did so with reservations.233 The small number
226. See 1926 Arrangement, supra note 205; supra text accompanying note 211.
227. Claudena M. Skran, Historical Development of International Refugee Law, in THE 1951
CONVENTION RELATING TO THE STATUS OF REFUGEES AND ITS 1967 PROTOCOL 3, 18 (Andreas
Zimmermann et al. eds., 2011).
228. Id.
229. See id. at 35.
230. SKRAN, supra note 174, at 111–12.
231. Id.
232. Id.
233. See id. at 129; HATHAWAY, supra note 176, at 88.
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of ratifications coupled with the fact that they only applied to certain refugee
groups as a result of the narrow definition of a refugee it had adopted meant
that the ratifications had very little practical impact.234
Nonetheless, the 1933 Convention marked a significant milestone in the
history of the international refugee regime. It was the first legally binding,
comprehensive instrument addressing the legal protection and standard of
conduct to be accorded to refugees. It is also significant because it established
important principles and norms in the treatment of refugees which would
serve as the foundation of the 1951 Refugee Convention. This is perhaps the
most important contribution that the 1933 Convention has made to modern
international refugee law.
A. The 1951 Refugee Convention
The Second World War marked a new era of mass displacement for
millions of people. It was estimated that there were more than forty million
displaced people who were reluctant to or could not return home because of
border changes—constituting the largest group displaced in history.235
Consequently, the need to develop a more durable and comprehensive
instrument arose in order to address the ongoing refugee movements.
The 1951 Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees (1951 Refugee
Convention)236 was subsequently drafted and came into force on April 22,
1954.237 It was clear, however, that the drafters intended for this instrument
to simply revise and consolidate the earlier refugee agreements, and to extend
their scope of protection.238 It was also intended that the 1951 Refugee
Convention would encourage a more equal sharing of responsibility for
refugees through the implementation of binding obligations.239

234. See SKRAN, supra note 174, at 129; HATHAWAY, supra note 176, at 88.
235. U.N. HIGH COMM’R FOR REFUGEES, THE STATE OF THE WORLD’S REFUGEES 2000: FIFTY
YEARS OF HUMANITARIAN ACTION 1, 13 (2020), https://www.unhcr.org/en-au-publications/sowr/
4a4c754a9/state-worlds-refugees-2000-fifty-years-humanitarian-action.html [hereinafter FIFTY
YEARS].
236. 1951 Convention, supra note 2.
237. Id.
238. Id. at pmbl.
239. Id. As noted in the preamble of the 1951 Refugee Convention, “the grant of asylum may place
unduly heavy burdens on certain countries, and []a satisfactory solution of a problem of which the
United Nations has recognized the international scope and nature cannot therefore be achieved without
international co-operation.” Id. at 13.
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The 1951 Refugee Convention was drafted by a combination of United
Nations organs, ad hoc committees, and a conference of plenipotentiaries with
the intent of ensuring that states could not again turn their backs on vulnerable
groups escaping persecution, and purported to provide a guarantee of nonrefoulement.240
The 1951 Refugee Convention was the first, and remains the only,
binding refugee-protection instrument of a universal character and has
become the foundation of the international refugee protection regime postWWII.
The definition of refugee adopted by the 1951 Refugee Convention was
restricted to those persons who had become displaced due to “events occurring
in Europe before 1 January 1951”241 and who were unwilling or unable to
return to their country of origin because of a well-founded fear of being
persecuted for one of five reasons.242 For the first time, a refugee was not
confined by reference to specific countries of origin. It also allowed signatory
states to elect to limit their obligations to refugees originating from “events
occurring in Europe.”243 Thus, these limitations make it clear that the 1951
Refugee Convention was originally drafted with the political goal of directly
responding to and assisting displaced European refugees who had been
affected by the Second World War.244
However, following the continuous displacement of persons across the
globe and a recognition that individuals may be displaced for reasons outside
of these temporal and geographical limitations, the 1967 Protocol Relating to
the Status of Refugees245 (1967 Protocol) removed these limitations and, in
theory, strengthened protection for refugees. The 1967 Protocol went into
force on October 4, 1967,246 and is a separate instrument from the 1951
Refugee Convention. Further, accession to it is not limited to those states
already party to the 1951 Refugee Convention.
The 1967 Protocol did not change the refugee definition in any material

240. See generally JAMES C. HATHAWAY & MICHELLE FOSTER, THE LAW OF REFUGEE STATUS (2d
ed. 2014).
241. 1951 Refugee Convention, supra note 2, at 15.
242. Id. at 14.
243. 1951 Convention, supra note 2, at 15.
244. See HATHAWAY & FOSTER, supra note 240.
245. Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees, Jan. 31, 1967, 606 U.N.T.S. 267, 268 [hereinafter
1967 Protocol] (amending 1951 Refugee Convention).
246. Id. at 267.

611

[Vol. 48: 577, 2021]

What It Means to Be a Religious Refugee
PEPPERDINE LAW REVIEW

way other than by removing the abovementioned temporal and geographical
limitations, thereby strengthening the protection of refugees.247 Article 1.2 of
the Protocol states that “[f]or the purpose of the present Protocol, the term
‘refugee’ shall . . . mean any person within the definition of article 1 of the
Convention.”248
Article 1A(2) of the 1951 Refugee Convention, as amended by the 1967
Protocol, mandates that refugee status should be granted to:
any person who . . . owing to well-founded fear of being persecuted
for reasons of race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular
social group or political opinion, is outside the country of his
nationality and is unable or, owing to such fear, is unwilling to avail
himself of the protection of that country . . . .249
Thus, as the 1951 Refugee Convention stands today, the rights and
protections conferred by the Convention are extended to all refugees, and not
just those affected by pre-1951 events in Europe.250 Moreover, the 1967
Protocol did not broaden rights under the 1951 Refugee Convention, but
simply incorporated them by reference under Article 1(1). Thus, in effect, the
aim of the 1967 Protocol was to expand the scope of the 1951 Refugee
Convention and allow for the universal coverage and protection of refugees.
However, the 1951 Refugee Convention definition only applies to
specific types of displaced people. In other words, in order to qualify for
refugee status, an individual must have a “well-founded fear of being
persecuted” in their homeland and the basis of this persecution cannot be
generic.251 This is in sharp contrast to the refugees of the inter-war era who
did not have to fear persecution nor explain their personal reasons for
fleeing.252 The individual must be outside of his home country.253
According to the UNHCR, a well-founded fear has both subjective and
objective components.254 Fear is subjective, and whether that fear is well247. Id. at 268.
248. Id.
249. 1951 Convention, supra note 2, at 14.
250. See HATHAWAY & FOSTER, supra note 240, at 10.
251. 1951 Convention, supra note 2, at 14
252. See 1933 Convention, supra note 217, at 203 (establishing a broad definition of a “refugee”
without requiring any explanation for their status).
253. 1951 Convention, supra note 2, at 152.
254. U.N. HIGH COMM’R FOR REFUGEES, HANDBOOK ON PROCEDURES AND CRITERIA FOR
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founded requires an objective evaluation.255 The applicant’s fear “should be
considered well-founded if he can establish, to a reasonable degree, that his
continued stay in his country of origin has become intolerable to him for the
reasons stated in the definition, or would for the same reasons be intolerable
if he returned there.”256
Further, as noted above, the basis for persecution cannot be generic. It
must be underpinned by one of five designated reasons.257 These are race,
religion, nationality, political group, or membership in a particular social
group.258 It is clear that the drafters of the 1951 Refugee Convention were
heavily influenced by the forms of persecution that were widespread during
this time. For example, the inclusion of religion reflects the desire to protect
Jewish victims who survived the Holocaust but could not return to
Germany.259
These five protection grounds, however, have acted as substantial
limitations to claiming refugee status. In effect, they restrict many persons
who are legitimately facing life-threatening situations from being granted
protection in a country outside of their own. Thus, if a person is outside his
country of origin and is almost certain to be killed if he returns to his country
of origin because of a generalized wide-ranging conflict or targeting by
powerful criminal gangs or corrupt government officials, his is not entitled to
invoke the 1951 Refugee Convention.
Importantly, the 1951 Refugee Convention continues to provide refugees
the guarantee of nonrefoulement under Article 33. According to this
principle, refugees cannot be expelled or returned to a country where they may
be subject to persecution on account of their “race, religion, nationality,
membership in a particular social group or political opinion.”260 However,
this right is not conferred upon refugees reasonably regarded as posing a risk
to national security or considered a danger to the community.261 The 1951
DETERMINING REFUGEE STATUS AND GUIDELINES ON INTERNATIONAL PROTECTION: UNDER THE
1951 CONVENTION AND THE 1967 PROTOCOL RELATING TO THE STATUS OF REFUGEES 19 (Feb. 2019),
https://www.unhcr.org/en-us/publications/legal/5ddfcdc47/handbook-procedures-criteriadetermining-refugee-status-under-1951-convention.html [hereinafter UNHCR Handbook].
255. Id.
256. Id. at 20.
257. 1951 Convention, supra note 2, at 14.
258. Id.
259. Id.
260. Id.
261. Id.
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Refugee Convention extends a number of other rights to refugees. For
example, refugees are entitled to the same rights as citizens in relation to
freedom of religion, intellectual property, access to courts and legal
assistance, accessing elementary education, labor rights, and social
security.262
As of October 2020, the total number of states party to the 1951 Refugee
Convention is 146,263 and those party to the 1967 Protocol is 147.264 The
number of states party to both the 1951 Refugee Convention and the 1967
Protocol stands at 142.265 There are also three countries (including the United
States) which have agreed to the 1967 Protocol only, and two small countries
that have agreed to the 1951 Refugee Convention only.266 Tens of millions of
displaced persons have been provided asylum under the Refugee Convention,
more than any other international instrument. Thus, despite the somewhat
arbitrary limits imposed in the 1951 Refugee Convention, it has proven to be
an incredibly successful platform upon which resettlement has occurred for
millions of refugees.267
IV. THE MEANING OF RELIGION FOR THE PURPOSES OF SECURING REFUGEE
STATUS
A. Overview of the Meaning of Religion
Freedom of religion is a well-established and fundamental human right.
At the same time, it has also “long been the basis upon which governments
and peoples have singled others out for persecution.”268 Although the context
262. Id.
263. See State Parties, Including Reservations and Declarations, to the 1951 Refugee Convention,
U. N. HIGH COMM’R FOR REFUGEES, https://www.unhcr.org/5d9ed32b4 (last visited Jan. 20, 2021).
264. See State Parties, Including Reservations and Declarations, to the 1967 Protocol Relating to
the Status of Refugees, U.N. HIGH COMM’R FOR REFUGEES, https://www.unhcr.org/5d9ed66a4 (last
visited Jan. 20, 2021).
265. See 1951 Refugee Convention, supra note 2.
266. See id. The countries that have agreed only to the 1951 Refugee Convention are Madagascar
and Saint Kitts and Nevis, while the countries that have agreed only to the 1967 Protocol are Cabo
Verde, the United States, and Venezuela. Id.
267. UNITED NATIONS HIGH COMM’R FOR REFUGEES, THE 1951 CONVENTION RELATING TO THE
STATUS OF REFUGEES AND ITS 1967 PROTOCOL 2 (Sept. 2011), https://www.unhcr.org/
4ec262df9.pdf.
268. Karen Musalo, Claims for Protection Based on Religion or Belief, 16 INT’L J. REFUGEE L. 165,
165–66 (2004) (footnote omitted).
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and contours of religious persecution have changed since WWII, its
persistence as a present-day issue and its need for protection has continued.
As Karen Musalo noted in 2004, many scholars believed that “religion will
not only continue to be a significant ground [for claims of protection], but that
it is likely to gain increasing prominence as a ground of protection . . . .”269 In
fact, the last fifteen years have seen a marked increase in government
restrictions and increasing levels of “social hostilities involving religion” in
many parts of the world.270 Indeed, President Trump recently stated that
freedom of religion is one of the central human rights claims he wants to
ensure that his government protects and observes.271
Religion, however, is not a simple concept. There is “[n]o universally
accepted definition of ‘religion’” for the purposes of the Refugee
Convention.272 The concept has become especially complex in recent
decades, given the proliferation of large numbers of different ideologies and
different versions of what previously appeared to be established ideologies.
Notwithstanding this, a review of the case law reveals that religious
persecution claims mostly involve mainstream religions which are clearly
recognizable to the decision maker, such as Christianity, Hinduism, and Islam.
As a result, there are only a handful of cases which examine whether the
asserted belief or idea system constitutes a “religion” under the 1951 Refugee
Convention.273 This is a common theme across all jurisdictions discussed
below.274 For this reason, the case law has contributed little to the analysis.
The case law, in fact, glosses over the main complexities underpinning the
concept of religion.
Rather, an examination of the case law has shown that a common sticking
point in religious persecution determinations is the credibility of the applicant,
specifically, whether the asserted religion has been genuinely adopted (or not

269. JAMES C. HATHAWAY, THE LAW OF REFUGEE STATUS 145, n.72 (1991); DEBORAH E. ANKER,
LAW OF ASYLUM IN THE UNITED STATES 398–99 (3d ed. 1999).
270. See A Closer Look at How Religious Restrictions Have Risen Around the World, PEW
RESEARCH CTR. (July 15, 2019), https://www.pewforumorg/2019/07/15/a-closer-look-at-howreligious-restrictions-have-risen-around-the-world/.
271. Presidential Determination on Refugee Admissions for Fiscal Year 2020, supra note 6.
272. See Holger Sonntag, Testing Religion: Adjudicating Claims of Religious Persecution Brought
by Iranians in the U.S. and Germany, 68 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 1020, 1021 (2014).
273. See generally Musalo, supra note 268, at 165.
274. See id. at 178 (stating that there “are very few U.S. cases which provide a clear presentation of
a claim based on discrimination on account of religion”).
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adopted) by the claimant.275 This is an especially complicated task in sur
place claims, which are claims involving post-departure religious
conversions. The jurisprudence reveals that claimants’ credibility is largely
based on their doctrinal knowledge of the asserted “religion” and that this is
determined through some form of trivia—which varies depending on the
religion.276 Moreover, different standards have also emerged across
jurisdictions.
Multiple sources suggest, however, that the applicant’s sincerity cannot
be judged based on their knowledge of the religion in question.277 One reason
for this is that decision makers often do not have sufficient knowledge
themselves to be able to determine whether an applicant’s faith is genuine.278
An added complexity arises when the “belief or practice is relatively new”
and therefore there may not be enough information available to determine
whether an individual’s fear of persecution on account of the religion is wellfounded.279
There remains little interpretative guidance beyond the case law. For
example, both the travaux préparatoires to the 1951 Refugee Convention and
the 1951 Refugee Convention itself are silent as to the meaning and scope of
“religion” for the purposes of satisfying Article 1A(2).280
Perhaps the most extensive discussion on this is found in the UNHCR
Handbook.281 The UNHCR Handbook, which was republished in 2019, has
long been recognized as a leading source of guidance in interpreting and
applying the 1951 Refugee Convention and the 1967 Protocol.282 It is not,
however, legally binding. The UNHCR Handbook refrains from setting out
in any definitive manner the meaning or scope of the term “religion” in the
context of refugee determinations; however, it does emphasize that the ground
be interpreted and applied “in a manner consistent with international norms,”
specifically citing the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and the
275. See id. at 218.
276. See AMANDA GRAY & ZIYA MERAL, FLEEING PERSECUTION: ASYLUM CLAIMS IN THE UK ON
RELIGIOUS FREEDOM GROUNDS 3, 4 (2016) (discussing the use of Bible trivia).
277. See id.; Musalo, supra note 268, at 225.
278. See GRAY & MERAL, supra note 276, at 4 (describing an incident in which a “caseworker had
not realised that an Anglican Church can also be an Evangelical one and found the applicant’s
testimony inconsistent as it did not match the church’s public information shown on its website.”).
279. Musalo, supra note 268, at 204.
280. Id. at 170.
281. See generally UNHCR Handbook, supra note 254.
282. Id.
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International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR).283
The freedom of religion as a fundamental right was articulated in Article
18 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR) as follows:
“Everyone has the right to freedom of thought, conscience and religion; this
right includes freedom to change his religion or belief, and freedom, either
alone or in community with others and in public or private, to manifest his
religion or belief in teaching, practice, worship and observance.”284 This right
was also incorporated into Article 18 of the ICCPR.285 Article 18 of the
ICCPR further “distinguishes between inner freedom of belief, and outer or
public freedom to manifest one’s beliefs.”286 The freedom to manifest beliefs
in public “may be subject only to such limitations as are prescribed by law
and are necessary to protect public safety, order, health, or morals or the
fundamental rights and freedoms of others.”287
The UNHCR Handbook further observes that:
72. Persecution for “reasons of religion” may assume various forms,
e.g. prohibition of membership of a religious community, of worship
in private or in public, of religious instruction, or serious measures of
discrimination imposed on persons because they practice their
religion or belong to a particular religious community.
73. Mere membership of a particular religious community will
normally not be enough to substantiate a claim to refugee status.
There may, however, be special circumstances where mere
membership can be a sufficient ground.288
In recognizing that “[c]laims to refugee status based on religion can be
among the most complex,” and that “[d]ecision makers have not always taken
a consistent approach when applying the term ‘religion’ contained in the . . .
definition of the [1951 Refugee C]onvention,” the UNHCR issued separate
guidelines in 2004 exclusively dealing with the protected ground of
“religion.”289 Again, the guidelines did not define a “religion” but rather
283.
284.
285.
286.
287.
288.
289.

Id. at 71.
G.A. Res. 217 (III) A, Universal Declaration of Human Rights, art. 18 (Dec. 10, 1948).
See Musalo, supra note 268, at 171.
Id. at 173.
Id. at 178.
UNHCR Handbook, supra note 254, at 16.
See U.N. High Comm’r for Refugees, Guidelines on International Protection: Religion-Based
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“provide[d] decision makers with guiding parameters to facilitate refugee
status determination . . . .”290 Accordingly, as construed under the 1951
Refugee Convention, religion encompasses “freedom of thought, conscience
or belief”291 and is “not limited . . . to traditional religions or to religions and
beliefs with institutional characteristics or practices analogous to those of
traditional religions.”292 Further, for the purposes of successfully invoking
this ground, it does not matter if a person belongs to a religious majority or
minority.293
The UNHCR Guidelines further state that “[c]laims based on ‘religion’
may involve one or more of the following elements: a) religion as belief
(including non-belief); b) religion as identity; c) religion as a way of life.”294
Belief is interpreted to include “theistic, non-theistic and atheistic beliefs” and
may be “convictions or values about the divine or ultimate reality or the
spiritual destiny of humankind.”295 Identity is about belonging to a
community “bound together by common beliefs, rituals, traditions, ethnicity,
nationality, or ancestry.”296 There is also an acknowledgment that
“persecutors are likely to target religious groups that are different from their
own because they see that religious identity as part of a threat to their own
identity or legitimacy.”297 Religion as a way of life may be seen through a
variety of activities, like “the wearing of distinctive clothing or observance of
particular religious practices, including observing religious holidays or dietary
requirements.”298
However, while this provides some guidance, it is neither definitive nor
comprehensive. Questions remain as to how the definition of refugee is to be
interpreted. As Holger Sonntag noted, “using a common international
definition of refugee, without more, has not resulted in similarly situated
Claims Under Article 1A(2) of the 1951 Convention and/or 1967 Protocol Relating to the Status of
Refugees, ¶ 1, U.N. Doc. HCR/GIP/04/06 (Apr. 28, 2004) [hereinafter UNHCR Guidelines].
290. Id.
291. Id. at ¶ 2 (citing UNHCR Handbook, supra note 254).
292. Id. at ¶ 4 (citing U.N. Human Rights Comm., CCPR General Comment No. 22: Article 18
(Freedom of Thought, Conscience or Religion), ¶ 2, U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/21/Rev.1/Add.4 (July 30,
1993)).
293. Id. at ¶ 12.
294. Id. at ¶ 5.
295. Id. at ¶ 6.
296. Id. at ¶ 7.
297. Id.
298. Id. at ¶ 8.
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applicants being treated similarly by the countries where they happen to seek
refuge from persecution.”299
In the U.S. domain, officials considering such applications must also
consider religious persecution under the International Religious Freedom Act
(IRFA).300 The effect of IRFA on asylum adjudications based on religious
persecution is to specifically incorporate the UDHR and ICCPR.301 In doing
so, IFRA protects a number of religious freedoms, including a person’s
“freedom to change his religion or belief, and freedom, either alone or in
community with others and in public or private, to manifest his religion or
belief in teaching, practice, worship, and observance.”302 These protections
also extend to “non-theists, humanists, and atheists.”303 The U.S. also requires
that the State Department train its foreign service officers in international
religious freedom.304 This training focuses not only on U.S. “religious
freedom policies,” but also on “religious traditions,” “religious and cultural
issues,” and “efforts to [prevent] violent religious extremism.”305 It is
important to note that IRFA is silent as to what makes a particular practice or
belief a “religion.”
Broadly, however, it is settled law among major common law countries—
the United States, Canada, and Australia—that people may warrant refugee
status not only because they risk persecution if they adhere to a particular
religion, but also because they do not belong to a certain religion.
In Prashar v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs, the
Australian Federal Court expressed that:
The Convention speaks of a “well-founded fear of being persecuted
for reasons of . . . religion. . .” In my opinion, if persons are
persecuted because they do not hold religious beliefs, that is as much
persecution for reasons of religion as if somebody were persecuting
them for holding a positive religious belief. The Convention protects

299. Sonntag, supra note 272, at 980. While Sonntag’s article examined a specific refugee group,
many of his observations also apply to the overall refugee system. Id. Sonntag examined the situation
of Iranian refugees attempting to flee to the United States and Germany. Id.
300. International Religious Freedom Act of 1998, 22 U.S.C.A. § 6401 (2016).
301. Id. at § 6401(a)(2).
302. Id. § 6401(a)(3).
303. See id. § 6401(6) (2016).
304. Training for Foreign Service Officers, 22 U.S.C. § 4028(a)(2) (2010).
305. Id. § 4028(a)(2)(C).
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people in relation to the subject matter of religious belief. It does not
protect believers and leave non-believers to the wolves.306
There is a second dimension to the protected ground of “religion.”
Persecution for religion includes the protection of those who are at risk of
serious harm because they engage in behavior prescribed by their religious
belief, or conversely, they do not participate in such activities or practices.307
Further, it is not necessary for the victim to actively promote or observe
their belief, or lack thereof.308 In other words, the Convention protects “the
followers as well as the leaders” and “the ordinary person as well as the
extraordinary one” in religious pursuits.309 However, it is widely accepted
that freedom of religion encompasses the right to not be expected to desist
from public expression or manifestation of a person’s religion. This principle
has been recognized across all jurisdictions. For example, U.S. courts have
strictly held that officials cannot force people to “forego practicing their
beliefs in public to avoid religious persecution, since being forced to practice
one’s beliefs underground is itself a form of persecution.”310 Similarly, in
Canada, individuals claiming asylum “cannot be asked to renounce their
deeply held beliefs or refrain from exercising their fundamental [human]
rights to avoid persecution and as a price to live in security.”311
Moreover, as is the case with all of the protected convention grounds, a
religious persecution claim can be grounded in a religious belief (or nonbelief) that has been externally attributed to the applicant, even if it has been
306. Prashar v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs [2001] FCA 57, [19] (Austl.).
307. See Reul v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration) (2000), 195 F.T.R. 65, paras.
12–16; Yang v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), 2001 F.C.J. No. 1463, paras. 10–
11; Liang v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration) (2011), F.C. 65, para 17; see also
HATHAWAY, supra note 176, at 146–47 (discussing the two dimensions of the protected “religion”
ground); GRAHL-MADSEN, supra note 185, at 218; GUY GOODWIN-GILL, THE REFUGEE IN
INTERNATIONAL LAW 27–28 (Ian Brownlie ed. 1983).
308. UNHCR Handbook, supra note 254, at 7.
309. Win v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs [2001] FCA 132, [20] (Austl.); see
also Shan Zhu Qiu v. Holder, 611 F.3d 403, 407 (7th Cir. 2010) (stating that “police are interested in
any Falun Gong practitioner, not merely the ‘core leaders’”).
310. Sonntag, supra note 272, at 1000 (citing U.S. CITIZENSHIP & IMMIGRATION SERVS., THE
INTERNATIONAL RELIGIOUS FREEDOM ACT (IRFA) AND RELIGIOUS PERSECUTION CLAIMS 26 (2009),
https://perma.cc/CKA3-MSGC; see also Shan Zhu Qui, 611 F.3d at 408 (stating that the U.S. Court
of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit observed that the Convention “exists to protect people from having
to return to a country and conceal their beliefs”).
311. IMMIGRATION & REFUGEE BD. OF CAN., INTERPRETATION OF THE CONVENTION REFUGEE
DEFINITION IN THE CASE LAW 3–1, (2019).
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falsely attributed. This is known as the imputed political opinion doctrine and
it is widely recognized across all jurisdictions.312
The following sections provide information on how refugee claims based
on religious persecution are pursued in leading refugee law jurisdictions—the
United States, Canada, and Australia. A more unified approach to the
religious ground specifically would result in greater protection for legitimate
refugees who are at risk for persecution on religious grounds and greater
protection of the right to freedom of religion, a fundamental human right.
B. United States of America
The 1951 Refugee Convention definition was first codified in domestic
United States law under the Refugee Act of 1980313—described as “the most
comprehensive U.S. law ever enacted concerning refugee admissions and
resettlement.”314 The Act intended to ensure U.S. immigration law was
consistent with its rights and obligations under the 1951 Refugee Convention
and, as such, adopted a refugee definition that is almost identical to the one in
the 1951 Refugee Convention.315 If the below definition is met, refugee status
may be granted under section 207 of the Immigration and Nationality Act
(INA) if the person is outside the U.S., or asylum status may be granted under
section 208 of the INA if the person is already in the U.S. or presents himself
or herself at a U.S. port of entry.316
Section 101(a)(42) of the INA, as modified by the 1951 Refugee Act,
defines a refugee as:
[A]ny person who is outside any country of such person’s nationality
or, in the case of a person having no nationality, is outside any
country in which such person last habitually resided, and who is
unable or unwilling to return to, and is unable or unwilling to avail
himself or herself of the protection of, that country because of
312. See, e.g., UNHCR Guidelines, supra note 232, at 9–10.
313. Refugee Act of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96–212, 94 Stat. 102 (1980). The United States did not sign
the Refugee Convention, but it adopted the obligations under the 1951 Refugee Convention by
accession to the 1967 Protocol, which explicitly incorporated the 1951 Convention definition of a
refugee.
314. Arnold H. Leibowitz, The Refugee Act of 1980: Problems and Congressional Concerns, 467
ANNALS AM. ACAD. POL. & SOC. SCI. 163, 164 (1983).
315. 126 CONG. REC. 3756 (1980) (Feb. 26, 1980) (statement of Sen. Kennedy).
316. PROPOSED REFUGEE ADMISSIONS, supra note 96, at 4.
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persecution or a well-founded fear of persecution on account of race,
religion, nationality, membership in a particular social group, or
political opinion . . . .317
There is no definition of “religion” in the INA. Further, as is the case
with the legislative history of the 1951 Convention, Congress did not provide
any guidance as to the meaning intended to attach to the ground under the
INA.318
Consistent with the UNHCR interpretation of the refugee definition, an
applicant must show a nexus between persecution and religion.319 However,
a unique feature of U.S. law, as compared to the other jurisdictions discussed,
is that the language of the U.S. definition of refugee differs slightly from the
definition provided in the 1951 Refugee Convention. U.S. law replaced the
phrase “for reasons of” with “on account of.” This was initially considered
an insignificant change.320 However, the phrase has “spawned a multitude of
tests and [has led to inconsistent] interpretations.”321 Ultimately, the U.S.
Supreme Court interpreted the definition to require “a demonstration that the
persecutor was motivated by one of the [five protected] reasons [contained]
in the refugee definition.”322 The Court did not meaningfully elaborate on
how an applicant is to prove the persecutor’s motive, but “since the statute
makes motive critical, he must provide some evidence of it, direct or
circumstantial.”323
In any context, providing evidence that proves the motivation of another
317. 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(42) (2014).
318. See 126 Cong. Rec. 3756–58 (1980).
319. See Sonntag, supra note 272, at 1021.
320. Brigette L. Frantz, Proving Persecution: The Burdens of Establishing a Nexus in Religious
Asylum Claims and the Dangers of New Reforms, 5 AVE MARIA L. REV. 499, 509 (2007).
321. Id. at 508.
322. Id. at 503 (citing Immigration Naturalization Serv. v. Elias-Zacarias, 502 U.S. 478, 482
(1992)); see Immigration Naturalization Serv. v. Elias-Zacarias, 502 U.S. at 482 (holding that the “on
account of” language in the refugee definition requires the applicant to prove either a nexus between
the persecution or the well-founded fear of persecution and the enumerated ground of protection
account of race, religion, nationality, political opinion, or membership in a particular social group).
Further, under the Real ID Act of 2005, the applicant must also show that one of the five reasons in
the refugee definition “was or will be at least one central reason for persecuting the applicant,” which
implicitly allows for a persecutor to have mixed motives. 8 U.S.C. § 1158(b)(1)(B)(i) (2009). In fact,
a persecutor may have many “central” reasons for persecuting an individual, and “whether one of those
central reasons is more or less important than another is irrelevant.” Ndayshimiye v. Attorney Gen.
of U.S., 557 F. 3d 124, 129 (3d Cir. 2009).
323. Elias-Zacarias, 502 U.S. at 483.
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person is an inherently difficult task—including for refugees who, in most
cases, due to their circumstances, will not have access to such evidence.324 It
is especially difficult for victims of religious persecution.325 The primary
corroborating evidence available in these cases comes in the form of letters
between family members or news articles, “neither of which are given the
same deference and attention as official documentation.”326 Proving a
persecutor’s motivation, which is inherently a difficult task, has resulted in a
higher burden on asylum applicants. This is an additional burden that
applicants must meet to justify the grant of political asylum. Thus, the
requirement is that an applicant must also provide corroborating evidence to
establish that the persecutor’s motivation has imposed an additional burden
on applicants to justify the grant of political asylum.
In a review of religious persecution case law, it is clear that there has been
no meaningful analysis by U.S. courts defining the parameters of “religion”
as protected under the 1951 Refugee Convention. Rather, many involve
issues of review by the Immigration Judge (IJ) or Board of Immigration
Appeals (BIA). Several of the cases reviewed for the purposes of this article
were appealed based on claims that the IJ or BIA did not give careful
consideration to the applicant’s claims.
For instance, in Kazemzadeh v. United States Attorney General,327 an
Iranian citizen filed an application for asylum claiming that he feared
persecution based on his conversion from Islam to Christianity.328 The
Eleventh Circuit vacated the decisions of the IJ and BIA based on the fact that
both failed to give reasoned consideration to Kazemzadeh’s evidence
indicating that he had a well-founded fear of persecution based on his
conversion to Christianity while in the United States.329 Kazemzadeh was
324. See Michelle Foster, Causation in Context: Interpreting the Nexus Clause in the Refugee
Convention, 23 MICH. J. INT’L L. 265, 333 (2002) (stating that asylum applicants face “evidentiary
obstacles” in proving a persecutor’s motivation because they “do not usually have time or ability to
gather evidence of their persecutor’s motives” while they are fleeing persecution (quoting Gafoor v.
Immigration & Natural Servs., 231 F.3d 645, 654 (9th Cir. 2000))).
325. See Frantz, supra note 320, at 523 (noting that “[c]ountries rarely, if ever, document a person’s
religion as the motivation for persecutory treatment”).
326. Id. (citing Eric T. Johnson, Religious Persecution: A Viable Basis for Seeking Refugee Status
in the United States? 1996 BYU L. REV. 757, 769–70 (1996)).
327. 577 F.3d 1341 (11th Cir. 2009).
328. Id. at 1345.
329. Id. at 1345, 1353–56. Kazemzadeh also appealed the IJ and BIA decisions holding that
evidence did not support a finding that Kazemzadeh had a well-founded fear of persecution based on
his political opinion, but the Eleventh Circuit agreed with the IJ and BIA on this ground. Id. at 1352–
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arrested a couple of times while engaging in freedom of speech and religious
rallies in Tehran; he was beaten and detained for four days; he was monitored
after his release; he was expelled from his university for “not following the
Islamic tradition”; and after leaving Iran, he was “sentenced in absentia to six
years imprisonment for his participation in anti-government activities.”330
According to the IJ and BIA, Kazemzadeh failed to prove that he had a wellfounded fear of persecution because not only did he fail to prove that anyone
in Iran knew of his conversion, he also failed to prove that there was a pattern
or practice of persecuting converted Christians.331 However, the IJ did not
make an explicit finding that Kazemzadeh’s testimony was not credible, and
as a result, the Eleventh Circuit accepted his testimony as credible.332
In addition to his testimony, Kazemzadeh presented evidence of his
personal interactions with the Iranian regime, as well as other evidence that
converts avoided such punishment by practicing underground, and the
Eleventh Circuit agreed with the Seventh Circuit’s decision that “having to
practice religion underground to avoid punishment is itself a form of
persecution.”333
Further, evidence indicated that while “[a]postasy,
specifically conversion from Islam, is punishable by death” in Iran, the antiapostasy laws were not enforced often.334 However, this evidence, in
conjunction with Kazemzadeh’s information about converts practicing
underground, may be sufficient to show a pattern or practice of persecution.335
53. The protected ground of political opinion is outside the scope of this article.
330. Id. at 1347–48.
331. Id. at 1350.
332. Id. at 1354 (citing De Santamaria v. Attorney Gen. of the U.S., 525 F.3d 999, 1011 n.10 (11th
Cir. 2008)).
333. Id. (citing Muhur v. Ashcroft, 355 F.3d 958, 960–61 (7th Cir. 2004)); see also id. at 1358
(Marcus J., concurring) (“The suggestion that a petitioner seeking asylum on account of religious
persecution may be required to practice his faith in the dead of night collides with our nation’s ideals
about the exercise of religious freedom. The right to practice only surreptitiously and under fear of
death is not free exercise.”); Woldemichael v. Ashcroft, 448 F.3d 1000, 1003 (8th Cir. 2006) (“Absent
physical harm, subjecting members of an unpopular faith to hostility, harassment, discrimination, and
even economic deprivation is not persecution unless those persons are prevented from practicing their
religion or deprived of their freedom.”); Iao v. Gonzales, 400 F.3d 530, 532 (7th Cir. 2005) (“[T]he
fact that a person might avoid persecution through concealment of the activity that places her at risk
of being persecuted is [not] inconsistent with her having a well-founded fear of persecution. On the
contrary, it is the existence of such a fear that motivates the concealment.” (citation omitted)); Zhang
v. Ashcroft, 388 F.3d 713, 719–20 (9th Cir. 2004) (requiring a petitioner “to practice his beliefs in
secret is contrary to our basic principles of religious freedom and the protection of religious refugees”).
334. Kazemzadeh, 577 F.3d at 1349.
335. See id. at 1354–55.
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Ultimately, the Court remanded this case for further analysis of the religious
persecution claim.336
In another case—this one involving a young Chinese woman who fled
China after being investigated for practicing Falun Gong—the Court focused
on the failure to make a reasoned decision because, as the Seventh Circuit
noted when it vacated the decision, “[t]he immigration judge’s opinion cannot
be regarded as reasoned; and there was no opinion by the Board of
Immigration Appeals.”337 After learning of Li’s activities, Chinese officials
“made repeated visits to the house in which she lived with her parents to tell
her to abandon Falun Gong, but she eluded them by residing mainly in her
aunt’s house.”338 Li received a summons but did not comply, and after police
continued to come to her home to ask questions, she fled the country.339
Unlike the previous case, Li did not claim past persecution, but rather claimed
a well-founded fear of future persecution on the basis of her religion.340 The
Seventh Circuit did not decide that she was entitled to asylum, but rather that
“she is entitled to a rational analysis of the evidence.”341
Although the outcomes of Iao and Kazemzadeh are the same, the
applicants’ asserted “religions” differ. In Kazemzadeh, the applicant had
converted from Islam to Christianity, both of which are very common
religions.342 On the other hand, Iao involves the religion of Falun Gong,
which is “often referred to as a ‘religion’ . . . though it is not a religion in the
Western sense.”343 Followers of Falun Gong do not worship a deity.344
Instead, “[t]he emphasis is on spiritual self-perfection through prescribed
physical exercises,” and China “persecutes adherents to Falun Gong,” making
it even more likely that Li would suffer persecution if she returned to China
and attempted to practice Falun Gong.345
Notably, neither the IJ nor the Seventh Circuit appeared to question the
type of religion at issue in Iao, nor did they embark on any attempt to ascertain

336.
337.
338.
339.
340.
341.
342.
343.
344.
345.

Id. at 1355–56.
Iao, 400 F.3d at 533.
Id. at 531.
Id.
See id. at 532.
Id. at 533.
See Kazemadeh, 577 F.3d at 1345.
Iao, 400 F.3d at 532.
Id.
Id.
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the meaning of a religion, but the IJ did question Li’s credibility based on her
knowledge of the religion.346 According to the IJ, Li was “quite vague
concerning her beliefs” and did not know that Falun Gong had a symbol,
though she was familiar with the exercises, which make up the core of Falun
Gong.347 There were also inconsistencies in her testimony regarding police
visits to her home, as well as her efforts to evade police.348 The Seventh
Circuit did not give much credence to these reasons, as it remanded the case
for a more reasoned analysis,349 but Iao is not the only case in which an
applicant’s knowledge of the religious beliefs they claim has been questioned.
A determination as to the applicant’s credibility must be made in all
asylum claims.350 Where an applicant claims persecution on the basis of his
or her religion, adjudicators are to determine “whether an applicant ‘adopted
a belief system solely for the purposes of trying to obtain asylum,’” but there
is no room for challenging the belief system itself.351
The issue of credibility is particularly difficult in sur place claims.352 In
sur place claims, applicants are often “suspected of opportunism, and the
genuineness of their [own] conversion becomes a key issue.”353 Thus, the
U.S. government, like many governments dealing with the refugee crisis, has
concern regarding refugees sur place. These are “individuals who did not
express their religious faith until they were away from their home country and
in the United States; as such, their refugee claims did not come into existence
until they were already outside the jurisdiction of their home countries.”354
Different courts have different views on sur place claims. For instance, the
Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals noted:
As with any form of relief available to immigrants and refugees

346. Id. at 532–33.
347. Id. at 532.
348. Id.
349. Id. at 533.
350. See Frantz, supra note 320, at 519–20.
351. Sonntag, supra note 272, at 1022.
352. See Musalo, supra note 268, at 223 (stating that sur place refugees claims, which occur when
an individual converts to a religion persecuted in their home country when they arrive in their host
country, are “suspected of opportunism” and questioned in their “genuineness”).
353. Id.
354. Michael J. Churgin, Is Religion Different? Is There a Thumb on the Scale in Refugee
Convention Appellate Court Adjudication in the United States? Some Preliminary Thoughts, 51 TEX.
INT’L L.J. 213, 224 (2016) (citing UNHCR Handbook, supra note 254, at 26).
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seeking to make their life in this country, there is some risk of abuse.
Our decision today serves another worthy policy interest. Indeed, it
is one of our oldest and most foundational policy interests—allowing
individuals to freely choose and exercise their own religion. The
timing of one’s religious choice is not determinative of one’s
rights. . . . If an individual’s religion places him at risk of
persecution, then this country provides a refuge.355
On the other hand, the Third Circuit saw it differently, noting that “there
is a perfectly plain basis for distinguishing between an applicant who
converted to Christianity after being ordered removed and one who was
already a Christian prior to such an order.”356 In any event, a well-founded
fear of persecution must be shown.
The applicant’s doctrinal knowledge of the claimed religion is also
relevant to a finding of credibility, irrespective of whether the applicant held
the religion prior to departure from their home country or converted whilst in
their host country. An applicant’s knowledge of religion, which is often
determined through some form of trivia, varies based on the religion.357
However, this has added a layer of complexity and uncertainty to the
adjudication of such claims.
For instance, in Rizal v. Gonzales,358 the Second Circuit faced the question
of “whether a certain degree of doctrinal knowledge of an asylum applicant’s
claimed religion is necessarily a prerequisite for asylum eligibility” on
religious grounds.359 In that case, the IJ issued an oral decision denying
Rizal’s claim because he “failed to persuade the Court of the genuineness of
his professed Christian faith based on his inability to demonstrate basic
knowledge of Christianity,” and “[t]he BIA affirmed without opinion.”360
According to the Second Circuit:
Both history and common sense make amply clear that people can
identify with a certain religion, notwithstanding their lack of detailed
knowledge about that religion’s doctrinal tenets, and that those same

355.
356.
357.
358.
359.
360.

Chandra v. Holder, 751 F.3d 1034, 1039 (9th Cir. 2014) (internal citations omitted).
Zhang v. Attorneyy Gen. of the U.S., 543 F. App’x 277, 285 (3d Cir. 2013).
See GRAY & MERAL, supra note 276, at 3, 27–28 (discussing the use of Bible trivia).
442 F.3d 84 (2d Cir. 2006).
Id. at 86.
Id. at 88–89 (internal quotations omitted).
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people can be persecuted for their religious affiliation. Such
individuals are just as eligible for asylum on religious persecution
grounds as are those with more detailed doctrinal knowledge.361
The Second Circuit went on to note that there may be instances where
level of knowledge is relevant, but Rizal was not such a case, and Rizal’s
testimony, if credible, should “have been sufficient to establish his identity as
a Christian, regardless of whether he could pass the doctrinal quiz posed to
him by the government and the IJ.”362
In another case examining this issue, the Eleventh Circuit vacated a
decision based on the fact that the IJ and BIA deemed an applicant’s
knowledge inadequate and did not give reasoned consideration to the
applicant’s claim that he had suffered past persecution because of his adoption
of the Jehovah’s Witness faith in the country of Georgia.363 According to the
Eleventh Circuit, the IJ did not “make a ‘clean’ adverse credibility
determination,” relying “instead on his view that Mezvrishvili had exhibited
insufficient commitment to the faith while in the United States and had
insufficient knowledge of the religious doctrine of Jehovah’s Witnesses.”364
However, the Eleventh Circuit noted that the issue in these cases is “whether
the applicant suffered religious persecution, not whether he displays the
knowledge of a seminarian during ‘a mini-catechism administered at the
hearing.’”365 The court did not dismiss an evaluation of an applicant’s
religious doctrinal knowledge as wholly irrelevant, noting that a lack of key
doctrinal facts could trigger suspicion.366
The decisions of Rizal and Mezvrishvili also raise the potential for
imputed religion, which involves a person being persecuted on account of
others’ perception of their religious beliefs. In the case of imputed religion,

361. Id. at 90 (footnote omitted) (citing Ahmadshah v. Ashcroft, 396 F.3d 917, 920 n.2 (8th Cir.
2005)) (“We are . . . not convinced that a detailed knowledge of Christian doctrine is relevant to the
sincerity of an applicant’s belief; a recent convert may well lack detailed knowledge of religious
custom. Even if [petitioner] did not have a clear understanding of Christian doctrine, this is not
relevant to his fear of persecution.”).
362. Id. at 90–91.
363. Mezvrishvili v. Attorney Gen. of the U.S., 467 F.3d 1292, 1293–94 (11th Cir. 2006).
364. Id. at 1296.
365. Id. (citing Yan v. Gonzales, 438 F.3d 1249, 1255 (10th Cir. 2006)).
366. Id. (citing Iao v. Gonzales, 400 F.3d 530, 534 (7th Cir. 2005)) (“[Of course] a purported
Christian who didn’t know who Jesus Christ was, or a purported Jew who had never heard of Moses,
would be instantly suspect . . . .”).
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an individual may have no knowledge of religious customs, but is persecuted
anyway.367 For this reason, applicants’ knowledge of their religion may be
relevant, but it is not the only important factor to consider.
Thus, even if an applicant converted to a religion only to obtain asylum,
such a conversion could still lead that person to be persecuted, and “[a]n agent
of persecution in another part of the world may not care about the sincerity of
someone’s beliefs or practices, but may simply impute these beliefs or
practices with or without objective justification.”368
Judge Posner, recognizing that many of the problems plaguing asylum
cases reoccur, created a list of “six disturbing features . . . that bulk large in
the immigration cases.”369 The six features are: (1) “[a] lack of familiarity
with relevant foreign cultures”; (2) “[a]n exaggerated notion of how much
religious people know about their religion”; (3) “[a]n exaggerated notion of
the availability, especially in poor nations, of documentary evidence of
religious membership”; (4) “[i]nsensitivity to the possibility of
misunderstandings caused by the use of translators of difficult languages, . . .
and relatedly, insensitivity to the difficulty of basing a determination of
credibility on the demeanor of a person from a culture remote from the
American, such as the Chinese”; (5) “[r]eluctance to make clean
determinations of credibility”; and (6) “[a]ffirmances by the Board of
Immigration Appeals either with no opinion or with a very short, unhelpful,
boilerplate opinion, even when, as in this case, the immigration judge’s
opinion contains manifest errors of fact and logic.”370
For the first feature, Judge Posner noted that “[d]ifferent religions attach
different weights to different aspects of the faith. Falun Gong, remember, is
not theistic; nor is it hierarchical. So far as appears, what is central is neither
doctrine nor symbol, but the exercises.”371 For the second feature, there is a
recognition that someone who does not know key facts about their religion
will be suspect, but also an admission that even the most religious may know

367. Id.; Rizal v. Gonzales, 442 F.3d 84, 90 n.7 (2d Cir. 2006) (“Indeed, even an individual who
does not subscribe to a certain religion, but is nonetheless being persecuted on account of others’
perception that he does, may well be able to establish a religious persecution claim under a theory of
‘imputed religion . . . .’”).
368. Sonntag, supra note 272, at 1023–25.
369. Iao, 400 F.3d at 533.
370. Id. at 533–35 (external citations omitted).
371. Id. at 533.
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very little about certain aspects of their faith.372 For the third feature, Judge
Posner noted that “[a]n acephalous, illegal religious movement is particularly
unlikely to issue membership cards.”373 For the fourth feature, Judge Posner
pointed out that behaviors that may be indicative of unreliability in one culture
may be indicative of respect in another culture.374 The fifth and sixth features
speak directly to the IJ’s failure to create an opinion that is useful upon
review.375
C. Canada
Canada is also party to the 1951 Refugee Convention and the 1967
Protocol.376 Canada’s Immigration and Refugee Protection Act (IRPA)
implements the 1951 Refugee Convention and is the primary mechanism for
management of Canada’s refugee system.377 Canada’s refugee system
consists of two parts: the Refugee and Humanitarian Resettlement Program
for individuals “seeking protection from outside of Canada,” and the InCanada Asylum Program for individuals making protection claims from
inside Canada.378 As part of the Refugee and Humanitarian Resettlement
Program, two categories of applicants exist, and the category of “Convention
Refugee Abroad Class” refers to individuals “who meet the definition of
refugee” under the 1951 Refugee Convention.379 Under the IRPA, a
convention refugee is defined as:
[A] person who, by reason of a well-founded fear of persecution for
reasons of race, religion, nationality, membership in a particular
social group or political opinion, (a) is outside each of their countries
of nationality and is unable or, by reason of that fear, unwilling to
avail themsel[ves] of the protection of each of those countries; or (b)
not having a country of nationality, is outside the country of their
former habitual residence and is unable or, by reason of that fear,
372. Id. at 534.
373. Id.
374. Id.
375. Id. at 534–35.
376. See 1951 Refugee Convention, supra note 2, at 138; 1967 Protocol, supra note 245, at 268.
377. Refugee Law and Policy: Canada, LIBRARY OF CONGRESS, https://www.loc.gov/law/help/
refugee-law/canada.php (last updated June 21, 2016) [hereinafter Law and Policy: Canada].
378. Id.
379. Id.
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unwilling to return to that country.380
As in the U.S., an applicant must establish a well-founded fear of
persecution.381 Further, a nexus must be proven between the persecution and
the protected ground, as indicated by the “by reason of” language present in
the definition under Canadian law.382 Thus, unlike the U.S., Canada strictly
adopts the language of the 1951 Refugee Convention definition; however,
there is inconsistency in its interpretation across different courts.
Where the U.S. looks to the intent of the persecutor, Canadian law takes
various approaches, considering intent in some cases and the effect of the
persecution in others.383 In any event, a nexus must be shown, and the court
must consider all of the 1951 Refugee Convention grounds—even if they were
not raised by the claimant.384
Under Canadian law, “[f]reedom of religion includes the right to manifest
the religion in public, or private, in teaching, practice, worship and
observance.”385 Further, much like in the U.S., individuals claiming asylum
“cannot be asked to renounce their deeply held beliefs or refrain from
exercising their fundamental [human] rights to avoid persecution and as a
price to live in security.”386
Yang marked the first attempt by a superior court to delineate the scope
of “religion” for the purposes of refugee law.387 In this case, the Federal Court
undertook the rare task of determining whether or not the applicant’s belief
system fell within the ambit of “religion” under the 1951 Refugee

380. Immigration and Refugee Protection Act, S.C. 2001, c 27, § 96 (Can.).
381. Law and Policy: Canada, supra note 378.
382. See IMMIGRATION & REFUGEE BD. OF CAN., supra note 311, at 4-1.
383. Compare Nejad v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship & Immigration), [1997] F.C.J. 1168, para.
3–4 (Can.) (external citation omitted) (“[To] the extent that an agent of persecution intentionally plays
upon or exploits the fact that a person suffers from a particular frailty or condition in order to cause
harm, an act not normally or inherently persecutorial, may be transformed into an act of persecution.
That is beautiful in theory, but who knows what is the intention of the persecutor? Who knows what
is the particular knowledge of the persecutor? One must look at the act and the effect.”), with Canada
(Attorney General) v. Ward, [1993] 2 S.C.R. 689, para. 83 (“[t]he examination of the circumstances
should be approached from the perspective of the persecutor”).
384. Suvorova v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship & Immigration), [2009] F.C. 373, para. 27, 28
(Can.).
385. See IMMIGRATION & REFUGEE BD. OF CAN., supra note 311, at 4-5 (footnote omitted).
386. Id. at 4-3.
387. See generally Yang v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship & Immigration), 2001 F.C. No. 1463,
para. 10 (Can.).
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Convention.388
The applicant, Yang, claimed that she feared that Chinese authorities
would persecute her on the basis that she ascribed/adhered to the beliefs and
practices of Falun Gong.389 In supporting her claim that Falun Gong was a
“religion” for the purposes of the Refugee Convention, she described the
impact and meaning of Falun Gong to her.390 She expressed that prior to
discovering Falun Gong, she had been suicidal and that the practice had
become “essential for her to cope with problems in her life.”391 The applicant
had appealed an earlier decision of the Immigration and Refugee Board,
Convention Refugee Determination Convention (Board), who rejected the
claim that Falun Gong constituted “a religion or an organization that cultivates
religious beliefs.”392
The Federal Court began its analysis by recognizing that Canadian courts
had not yet clearly defined the meaning of “religion” under the IRPA.393 In
light of this, the Federal Court considered a number of authorities, scholars,
and international instruments for guidance, including the UNHCR
Handbook.394
In delivering the judgment, Judge Dubé observed that
[t]he evidence shows that the applicant took up the practice of Falun
Gong because she was depressed to the point of being suicidal.
Through Falun Gong she recognized the true meaning of life,
enriched her culture and improved her health. She said that following
Falun Gong gave her spiritual trust and made her life happier.
Finally, group practice is a key part of Falun Gong. Together, the
participants can share information, encourage each other, and support
each other “just like Christianity . . . if a person go to attend a church”
[sic]. All these assertions of the applicant can be found in the
transcript.395
The Federal Court further observed that any determination under the 1951
388.
389.
390.
391.
392.
393.
394.
395.
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Refugee Convention “must be approached from the point of view of the
persecutor since that is the motive that incites the persecution.”396 Therefore,
“[if] Falun Gong is considered by the Government of China to be a religion,
then it must be so for the purposes of the instant claim.”397
The Federal Court held that the Canadian Immigration and Refugee Board
had erred in holding that Falun Gong was not a religion under the 1951
Refugee Convention.398 “The decision of the Board was set aside” and
remitted back to the Board.399 Ultimately, apart from placing emphasis on the
persecutor’s view, the Federal Court’s discussion contributed little to the
“religion” analysis.400
The meaning of the word “religion” in the context of refugee
determination has also more recently been considered by the Supreme Court
of Canada:
Defined broadly, religion typically involves a particular and
comprehensive system of faith and worship. Religion also tends to
involve the belief in a divine, superhuman or controlling power. In
essence, religion is about freely and deeply held personal convictions
or beliefs connected to an individual’s spiritual faith and integrally
linked to one’s self-definition and spiritual fulfilment, the practices
of which allow individuals to foster a connection with the divine or
with the subject or object of that spiritual faith.401
As noted above, Yang marks one of the only cases to have specifically
considered the meaning and scope of this convention ground. Beyond this,
there is relatively limited guidance in the jurisprudence. The majority of the
case law in this area turns to the credibility of the applicant. Canadian courts
are also required to make credibility findings and do so by undertaking an
evaluation by “assessing the applicant’s knowledge of religion and
consistency of actions with the religion.”402 Thus, similarly to the U.S.,
396. Id. at para. 19.
397. Id.
398. Id. at para. 26. The Federal Court also held that Falun Gong did not constitute a “particular
social group”; however, this is beyond the scope of this article. Id.
399. Id. at para. 27.
400. Id. at para. 28.
401. Syndicat Northcrest v. Amselem, [2004] 2 S.C.R. 551, para. 39 (Can.).
402. Id.; see also UNHCR Handbook, supra note 254, at 130 (“Credibility is a central issue in
religion-based refugee claims. . . . [K]knowledge tests need to take account of individual
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applicants’ knowledge of their religion may impact whether Canadian courts
determine an applicant is a 1951 Refugee Convention refugee and eligible for
protection. In either case, inconsistencies have emerged as to the standard of
knowledge or understanding that must be held.
For instance, in Ullah v. Canada,403 Ullah was a Pakistani citizen and
member of the Shia Muslim minority, and the Board determined that he was
not a refugee under the 1951 Refugee Convention.404 The Board made a
negative credibility finding based on the applicant’s lack of “knowledge of
the principle doctrines of the Shia religion,” which included his lack of
knowledge regarding the key figures of the religion.405 Additionally, the
Board determined he was not a practicing Shia, and that he had not had
problems with the Sapah-e Sahaba of Pakistan or the police.406 However, on
appeal, it was determined that the Board applied “too high a standard to the
Plaintiff’s knowledge of his religion” and may have “erroneously expected
the answers of the Applicant to questions about his religion to be equivalent
to the Board’s own knowledge of that religion.”407 The Board also failed to
consider other 1951 Refugee Convention grounds for protection.408 The
application for judicial review was approved, and the case was remitted to the
Board for a new hearing in front of a different panel.409
In a more recent case, an Iranian citizen claimed fear of persecution based
on his conversion to Christianity, and his fear materialized upon learning that
police had gone to his home and searched it.410 The applicant testified about
his conversion to Christianity, the steps he took, why he chose Christianity,
the classes he took, and the locations of churches he attended.411 The Refugee
Protection Division (RPD) determined that he lacked knowledge about
various Christian ceremonies and also questioned the fact that he had not been
practicing his religion while visiting family members in Canada.412 According
circumstances, particularly since knowledge of a religion may vary considerably depending on the
individual’s social, economic or educational background and/or his or her age or sex.”).
403. Ullah v. Can [2020] CanLII 16589 at 2 (F.C.).
404. Id. at para. 1.
405. Id. at para. 2.
406. Id. at para. 3.
407. Id. at para. 11.
408. Id. at para. 12.
409. Id. at para. 14.
410. X (Re), [2017] CanLII 87461, paras. 8–9 (C.A. I.R.B.).
411. Id. at para. 43.
412. Id. at para. 38.
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to the applicant’s testimony, he had not practiced his religion while in Canada
because his family members were Muslim and did not practice Christianity.413
Additionally, the Refugee Appeal Division (RAD) determined, with regard to
the applicant’s knowledge, “it is normal that his knowledge would be more
limited as he comes from Iran, which is a very closed environment that is
focused on Islam and where conversion to that religion is severely
punished.”414 According to the RAD, the RPD erred in its conclusion that the
applicant was not Christian,415 and “[t]he appellant demonstrated on a balance
of probabilities that he converted to Christianity by being baptized in
Montreal. He is facing a serious possibility of being persecuted because his
baptism is evidence of his conversion, which is punishable by death.”416
In another case, an applicant having sufficient knowledge of his claimed
religion did not result in a finding that the applicant was a 1951 Refugee
Convention refugee and deserved protection.417 An Iranian citizen claimed
refugee protection based on a well-founded fear of persecution due to his
conversion to Mormonism.418 The applicant claimed that he converted to
Mormonism in Iran, tried to spread the religion, held meetings, photocopied
and distributed the Book of Mormon, and changed his name.419 He went into
hiding once he learned that police were looking for him, and he claimed his
friends who had also converted were arrested, detained, and murdered.420
While the applicant had knowledge about the “beliefs, prohibitions, and
voluntary obligations” of Mormonism, the Board discounted his testimony
because such “information is accessible to anyone on the internet.”421 The
fact that others testified that the applicant did not drink wine also was not
persuasive because the same could be said of Muslims.422 Despite the fact the
applicant had some knowledge of Mormonism, the panel ultimately
determined that his conversion was one of convenience made to benefit from

413.
414.
415.
416.
417.
418.
419.
420.
421.
422.

Id. at para. 45.
Id. at para. 46.
Id. at para. 53.
Id. at para. 76.
See X (Re), [2005] CanLII 60021, para. 7 (C.A. I.R.B.).
Id. at para. 2.
Id. at para. 4
Id. at para. 5.
Id. at para. 20.
Id. at para. 21.
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refugee protection.423
In some cases involving refugee claims on the ground of religious
persecution, it is not necessarily the applicant’s knowledge that causes
problems. Sometimes, it is the immigration officer’s method of applying the
law in a specific case. For example, in Zhang v. Canada,424 a Chinese citizen
who converted to Christianity while living in China learned that his pastor had
been arrested, and because he feared he would be arrested if he returned to
China, he filed for asylum.425 The applicant’s knowledge regarding general
Christianity was tested, and he knew some things but not others.426 The RPD
member concluded that while he had some knowledge, “that knowledge does
not necessarily mean he is a genuine practicing Christian.”427 While the
applicant produced letters from pastors and a certificate confirming his
baptism in Canada, the RPD member determined that these items could “only
attest to the claimant’s participation in church activities[;] they do not attest
to his motivation.”428 The RPD member determined that the applicant was not
a Christian and that his claim was not made in good faith;429 however, on
appeal, the court vacated the decision and remanded it for review in front of a
different panel.430 The court determined that the RPD member had conducted
a subjective analysis of the applicant’s knowledge of Christianity.431 The
court, in rejecting this approach, relied on a decision by the Supreme Court,
noting “it ‘is not the role of [the] Court to decide what any particular religion
believes.’”432 The court determined that the RPD member’s “finding of
implausibility that a certain person is not of a certain faith because he or she
does not meet a certain subjective standard set by a decision-maker is
indefensible as a matter of fact.”433 Furthermore, the RPD member’s method
of questioning was “indefensible as a matter of law.”434 Because “knowledge
423.
424.
425.
426.
427.
428.
429.
430.
431.
432.
70).
433.
434.
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Id. at para. 38.
[2012] F.C. 503, para. 6 (Can.).
Id. at para. 3.
Id. at para. 4.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at para. 28.
Id. at paras. 6, 13, 18.
Id. at para. 10 (citing Ross v. New Brunswick Sch. Dist. No. 15, [1996] 1 S.C.R. 825, para.
Id. at para. 16.
Id. at para. 17. The RPD member’s questions can be seen in paragraph 7 of the opinion. See
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of religious dogma[] does not equate to holding religious faith” and because
the RPD member did not properly consider the totality of the circumstances,
the decision was vacated.435
In yet another case, the RAD characterized as “fundamentally flawed” a
decision of the RPD that a Chinese citizen had no reason to fear persecution
in China due to her Christian beliefs.436 The applicant joined a house church
after being forced to undergo an abortion to comply with Chinese family
planning regulations.437 The church was raided, after which she fled and
learned that agents had come to her home to determine her whereabouts.438
The applicant preferred the underground church—rather than the statesanctioned church—because she believed the state-sanctioned church “put the
government first whereas her congregation puts Jesus Christ first.”439 The
RPD had concerns about her credibility after her interview, but continued the
process and ultimately determined that her “understanding of Christianity was
not sophisticated enough that her religious needs could not be met within the
framework of the state-sanctioned church structure, her convictions being
limited to a belief in God and a belief in the role of Jesus as Savior.”440 As a
result, the RPD found that she had no reason to fear persecution in China.441
This decision was set aside because the RPD accepted her convictions as
sincere but entirely “discount[ed] the subjective aspect of religious belief” by
essentially holding that “the legitimacy of a person’s belief can and should be
measured against his or her level of religious sophistication.”442

id. at para. 7.
435. Id. at paras. 23, 27.
436. Zhu v. Canada, [2008] F.C. 1066, paras. 8, 12 (Can.).
437. Id. at para. 4.
438. Id.
439. Id. at para. 5.
440. Id. at para. 8.
441. Id.
442. Id. at para. 17. This is consistent with the Supreme Court’s view that “claimants seeking to
invoke freedom of religion should not need to prove the objective validity of their beliefs in that their
beliefs are objectively recognized as valid by other members of the same religion, nor is such an
inquiry appropriate for courts to make.” Id. at para. 16 (citing Syndicat Northcrest v. Amselem, [2004]
S.C. 47, para. 43 (Can.)).
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D. Australia
In contrast to the U.S. and Canada, more detailed consideration has been
given by Australian courts as to the meaning of “religion” in asylum
determinations; however, it has yet to be precisely defined. In Church of the
New Faith v Commissioner of Pay-Rolls Tax (Vic), the question before the
Australian High Court was whether Scientology constituted a religion.443
Although this was for the purpose of taxation law, the court set out a number
of clear principles which have subsequently been cited by courts in the refugee
domain.444
The hallmarks of a “religion” as set out by Judge Wilson and Judge Deane
in that case are summarized in Butterworths Australian Legal Dictionary:
A system of ideas and practices, usually involving a belief in the
supernatural . . . . There exists no formularised legal criterion,
whether of inclusion or exclusion, for determining whether a given
system constitutes a religion. However, indicia derived from
empirical observation of accepted religions can be used as guidelines,
some of which are: that there is belief in the supernatural; that the
system of ideas relates to the place of humanity in the universe and
its relationship with the supernatural; that the ideas are accepted by
adherents as requiring the observation of particular codes of conduct;
that the adherents constitute an identifiable group; and that they see
the system as constituting a religion.445
Further, the Court made clear that these guidelines are simply “aids” in
determining “whether a particular collection of ideas and/or practices should

443. (1983) 154 CLR 120, 129 (Austl.).
444. See id. at 135; see also, e.g., Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs v Darboy
(1998) 52 ALD 44, 50 (quoting Judge Mason and Judge Brennan in Church of the New Faith v
Comm’r of Pay-Rolls Tax (Vic) (1983) 154 CLR 120) (recounting that the Federal Court cited, with
approval, the following passage from the High Court’s judgment: “The canons of conduct which he
accepts as valid for himself in order to give effect to his belief in the supernatural are no less a part of
his religion than the belief itself. Conversely, unless there be a real connection between a person’s
belief in the supernatural and particular conduct in which that person engages, that conduct cannot
itself be characterized as religious.”).
445. Religion, BUTTERWORTHS AUSTRALIAN LEGAL DICTIONARY 1007 (1997) (referring to Church
of the New Faith v. Comm’r of Pay-Rolls Tax (Vic) (1983) 154 CLR 120); see Church of the New
Faith, 154 CLR at 136 (Mason, A.C.J.; Brennan, J.); Church of the New Faith, 154 CLR at 151
(Murphy, J.); Church of the New Faith, 154 CLR at 174 (Wilson and Deanne, JJ.).
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be [] characterised as ‘a religion,’” and ultimately the weight to be accorded
to them will differ depending on the situation in which the issue arises.446
In Wang v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs, the Full
Court of the Federal Court considered the meaning of “religion” for the
purposes of Article 1A of the 1951 Refugee Convention.447 In delivering the
main judgement,448 Judge Merkel, with whom Judge Gray agreed, observed
that for the purposes of the Convention, “the Courts have generally taken a
broad view of what constitutes the practice of religion.”449 Further, according
to Judge Merkel450:
It is clear that there are two elements to the concept of religion for the
purposes of Art 1A(2): the first is as a manifestation or practice of
personal faith or doctrine, and the second is the manifestation or
practice of that faith or doctrine in a like-minded community. I would
add that that interpretation is consistent with the commonly
understood meaning of religion as including its practice in or with a
like-minded community.451
In the same case, Judge Wilcox agreed that the concept of religion was
made up of these two central elements.452 He went on to acknowledge that
whilst “[s]ome religious rites may be privately practiced by individual
believers; [] the major world religions, at least, also require or encourage their
adherents to participate in communal rites or practices.”453 Moreover, “the
form and content of [such] rites and practices is often a matter of enormous
importance to adherents of a particular faith, as is their system of
governance.”454
The court ultimately held that the Tribunal had failed to acknowledge the
second element, which is the community manifestation of religious faith, and

446.
447.
448.
22.
449.
450.
451.
452.
453.
454.

Church of the New Faith, 154 CLR at 174.
[2000] FCA 1599, ¶ 69 (considering the meaning of “religion” for refugee purposes).
Id.; see also Liu v Minister for Immigration & Multicultural Affairs [2001] FCA 257, ¶¶ 19–
Wang, (2000) 105 FCR at 563 ¶ 69.
Id. at ¶¶ 73, 79.
Id. at ¶ 81.
Id. at ¶ 5.
Id. at ¶ 7.
Id. at ¶ 8.
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therefore adopted an “unduly narrow interpretation” of the term “religion.”455
This above interpretation of “religion” by Judge Merkel was subsequently
upheld by the Federal Court, in W244/01A.456 In this case, the applicant, an
Iranian male, had claimed that he was a non-Muslim who believed in God but
had not told anyone about this.457 In delivering his judgment, Judge R.D.
Nicholson appeared to have taken the two central elements as both essential,
stating:
It follows that, absent any manifestation or practice of the applicant’s
faith or doctrine in a like-minded community, there was no basis on
which he could be found to have a well-founded fear of persecution
on the Convention ground of “religion.” The Tribunal was therefore
correct to rely on the absence of such communal manifestation for
reaching its conclusion there could not be any well-founded fear of
persecution on the ground of the applicant’s religion.458
Judge R.D. Nicholson concluded that:
As to the applicant’s contention that his faith had been manifested—
not by positive conduct—but by non-attendance at Muslim prayers,
that is not a manifestation of the requisite type because it does not
occur “in a like-minded community” . . . . As I read the views of the
Full Court, however, manifestation by practice of abstention from
Muslim prayers alone will not be a manifestation or practice of the
applicant’s religion unless there first be the presence of the faith or
doctrine in a like-minded community. Although therefore it cannot
assist the applicant, I note that JC Hathaway, The Law of Refugee
Status (Butterworths, Toronto, 1991) at pp 145–146 considers “an
individual’s right to religion implies the ability to live in accordance
with a chosen belief, including participation in or abstention from
formal worship and other religious acts, expression of views, and the
ordering of personal behaviour.”459

455.
456.
457.
458.
459.
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Id. at ¶ 37.
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As to the Tribunal’s conclusion that the applicant’s commitment to
his beliefs was not such as would lead him into future conduct giving
rise to a likelihood of persecution for the Convention reason of his
religion, the Tribunal had evidence before it to justify the conclusion
it reached. Further, it was a finding with which this Court cannot
interfere or remake.460
As to the issue of credibility, testing an applicant on their knowledge or
understanding of the religion in question is considered a legitimate technique
in order to determine whether that belief has been sincerely adopted.461
In Wang, despite the Tribunal making a favorable finding that the
applicant possessed “rudimentary knowledge” of Christianity,462 the court
expressed concerns as to the emphasis on an applicant’s doctrinal knowledge
of their claimed religion, stating:
The RRT receives many applications from persons who seek
protection visas, claiming well-founded fear of being persecuted by
reason of religion. It is inconceivable that every member of the RRT
is properly equipped to assess each such applicant on the basis of the
applicant’s knowledge of the faith that he or she professes. Religion
is a matter of conscientious belief, professed adherence and practice.
The RRT seems to have approached the issue on the basis that the
appellant had to satisfy the RRT that he was possessed of a specific
level of doctrinal knowledge to justify being regarded as a Christian.
It is not appropriate for the RRT to take on the role of arbiter of
doctrine with respect to any religion.463
In MZZJO v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection, the court
emphasized that “what must be undertaken is questioning of that particular
460. Id. at ¶ 38.
461. See, e.g., Minister for Immigration & Citizenship v SZOCT (2010) 189 FCR 577, 579–80 [6]–
[10] (discussing the visa applicant’s knowledge of Christianity); Minister for Immigration &
Citizenship v SZLSP (2010) 187 FCR 362, 375 [39] (discussing the respondent’s understanding of
Falun Gong doctrine); Mashayekhi v Minister for Immigration & Multicultural Affairs (2000) 97 FCR
381 (discussing the applicant’s conversion to Catholicism in Iran); SBCC v Minister for Immigration
& Multicultural Affairs [2006] FCAFC 129, [45]–[49] (discussing the appellant’s claim that he had
become a practitioner of Falun Gong).
462. Wang v Minister for Immigration & Multicultural Affairs (2000) 105 FCR 548, 551 [15]
(Gray, J.).
463. Id. at 552 [16] (Gray, J.).
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individual’s belief rather than the application of some standardized or
assumed level of knowledge.”464 Nevertheless, inconsistencies have arisen as
to the standard of knowledge an applicant must possess. For example, in
SZLSP v Minister for Immigration and Citizenship,465 the tribunal rejected the
applicant’s claim to be an adherent of Falun Gong on the basis that the
applicant’s knowledge of Falun Gong was less than that which would be
expected of a genuine practitioner. The court held that the tribunal erred in
applying this common knowledge standard.466 In contrast to this, in SZONH
v Minister for Immigration and Citizenship,467 the court found no error in the
tribunal rejecting the applicant’s claim to be a genuine Christian on the basis
of the common knowledge standard:
An evaluation of an internally held attribute—such as an opinion or
a belief—is likely to involve questions about how the individual
understands that belief, what it means to that individual, how she or
he manifests that belief. Testing a claim to hold a particular political
opinion may need to be undertaken in this way and the same is true
of a claim to hold a religious belief. There is no immunity from
scrutiny simply because the Convention ground is religious belief.
What the authorities have pointed to, however, is a need for the
questioning to be rationally capable of assisting a decision whether
the person’s claim to hold the belief is genuine or not.468
Ultimately, the Federal Court has cautioned that “holding a religious faith
is a core, and highly personal, part of an individual’s identity,” and that it is a
very serious finding for a decision maker to find that an individual does not
hold such a faith.469
V. PROPOSED DEFINITION
From the above, it follows that there is no settled definition or meaning
of “religion” for the purposes of the 1951 Refugee Convention. Indeed, in the

464.
465.
466.
467.
468.
469.
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United States, the concept has not even received considered or deep
discussion by courts or jurists. This is unacceptable from the perspective of
the rule of law and also pragmatically, given the often life-defining
importance associated with determinations regarding an individual’s right to
asylum.
It is accepted that the concept of religion is complex and multi-faceted;
however, this does not undermine the need to establish a workable and clear
definition of the term. Religion, like many concepts, can be context sensitive.
Accordingly, it follows that in ascribing a meaning to this term, it is important
to contextualize it by reference to the nature and scope of the relevant legal
instrument document. It is for this reason that the discussion in Part II of this
article regarding the history and background of the 1951 Refugee Convention
is of considerable importance.
As has been noted, the 1951 Refugee Convention was drafted and
implemented against the backdrop of large numbers of displaced people who
had been forced from their homeland by destabilizing events typically in the
nature of war or wide-ranging internal persecution. The other defining
backdrop to the 1951 Refugee Convention was a reluctance by other countries
to absorb large numbers of displaced people and a desire to inject a degree of
order and predictability into this process. At the core of the 1951 Refugee
Convention is the desire to provide desperate people who have been forcibly
displaced from their homeland with the opportunity to forge a new life in
another country. Logically, this aim would be undercut or compromised if
arbitrary or technical meanings were ascribed to the 1951 Refugee
Convention grounds, which would have the effect of unduly narrowing the
pool of people who could qualify for protection.
As we have seen, the instruments underpinning the 1951 Refugee
Convention and the UNHCR Handbook, which elaborate on the meaning of
religion, provide for an expansive definition which avoids arbitrary and
unnecessary qualifications and limitations. This indeed conforms with the
wider meaning which is often attributable to the concept of religion in the
context of other areas of the law.
To this end, the Australian High Court has had reason to carefully
consider the nature and meaning of religion in the context of constitutional
law and this has informed the interpretation of the 1951 Refugee Convention
in Australia.
Of particular relevance is the meaning ascribed in Wang, where the court
emphasized that there are two key aspects to the meaning of religion under
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the 1951 Refugee Convention.470 The first is a manifestation of a practice
based on personal faith and the second is the manifestation of that practice in
a like-minded community.471 Key to this definition is that there is no
requirement that the faith should involve any particular types of beliefs,
attitudes, or thoughts. Moreover, there is no minimum number of other
individuals that are required to form a community that also manifests the
practice of a relevant nature.
However, a core aspect of a religion is that the belief is at least partially
dependent upon faith. If all of the key beliefs held by an individual are
verifiable by rational inquiry, then it is unlikely that they can constitute a
religion. That said, there are no restrictions regarding the key beliefs which
are the objects of the faith. The central aspect of a religion is belief in an
ideology that involves an element of faith, which is shared by some other
people in the community—although there is no minimum number of people
that need to comprise such a community.
In addition to this, religion also often is part of a person’s identity or way
of life, but this is not essential in every case—it can merely be a core belief
held by an individual. The concept of a religious belief is wide-ranging and
should include theistic beliefs and convictions about the divine or spiritual
aspect of humankind. It should not require any particular substantive ideals
underpinning the conviction. Thus, practices such as Falun Gong and even
Scientology are religions. There are a number of ways in which people can
establish that religion is a key aspect of their identity, including by the attire
they wear, the food they consume, and ceremonies in which they participate.
Thus, while most religious adherents engage in some type of specified
conduct or behavior, for example praying or attending a mass, the fact that an
individual does not participate frequently in this conduct does not necessarily
negate the fact that their belief system does not constitute a religion.
Further, as we have seen, many determinations regarding a person’s
eligibility for refugee protection pursuant to the religion ground revolve
around the individual’s credibility and, in particular, whether or not they are
genuinely adherent of the religion in question. Religions, as we have seen,
often represent a complex set of values and beliefs, which are often equivocal
and subject to a fair degree of interpretation—both in terms of the content of

470. Wang v Minister for Immigration & Multicultural Affairs (2000) 105 FCR 548, 565 [81]
(Merkel, J.).
471. Id.
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the religion and the types of rituals and behaviors consistent with the
religion.There is also often ambiguity relating to the core behaviors which are
required of any religion. Thus, it is often misguided for a court or tribunal to
require any individual to have a minimal level of understanding of aspects of
a religion or to demonstrate a threshold of behavioral characteristics
consistent with a religion, in order for the individual to prove that they belong
to a certain religion. It follows that as a general rule, credibility issues
regarding membership or belonging to a certain religion should be interpreted
in favor of the applicant.
It should also be accepted that persecution on the basis of religion should
also extend to persecution where the individual does not ascribe to a particular
religion or are wrongly believed to practice a certain religion. The reason for
this is that the motivating force for the persecution is the religion, albeit of the
persecutor.472
VI. CONCLUSION
The world is experiencing an unprecedented crisis in terms of the amount
of displaced people that have been forcibly moved from their country of
origin.473 There is no overarching solution for dealing with this problem. It
is clear that most countries, and in particular developed countries, have no
desire to absorb large numbers of displaced people. Accordingly, developing
countries are forced to disproportionately bear the burden of accommodating
millions of displaced people. The absorption into these other countries is not
systematic or planned, but rather haphazard, and in most circumstances, there
are insufficient resources to properly accommodate asylum seekers.
There is no overarching plan by developed countries to increase their
intake of displaced people. This is regrettable, but it reflects the current reality
and one which is unlikely to change in the foreseeable future. As a result of
this, current mechanisms through which displaced people can obtain asylum
in other countries assume even greater importance. The 1951 Refugee
Convention remains the main and only vehicle through which displaced
people can secure asylum in countries that have ratified the 1951 Refugee
Convention, such as the United States. The number of people who can enter
the United States pursuant to the 1951 Refugee Convention is of course

472. See UNHCR Guidelines, supra note 289, at 3.
473. See GLOBAL TRENDS 2018, supra note 1.
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limited by quotas and policies by the receiving country. To this end, the
United States has imposed drastic reductions in the amount of people who can
enter the country as refugees. Although the amount of people who can enter
as asylees remains high, in reality, however, this is significantly limited as a
result of slow processing times of such applications and the unwillingness of
the United States government to devote meaningful resources to administering
such applications.
Thus, refugee places in the United States are now scarcer than at any time
in recent history. It follows that in assessing the eligibility of asylum seekers,
decisions must be coherent, consistent, and jurisprudentially sound. As we
have seen, one of the key requirements for refugee status is that the person
fears for their safety on the basis of one of five discrete grounds. One of the
most important grounds is religion. This is especially significant given that
many disruptive events, such as war, which results in the forcible
displacement of large numbers of people, revolve around different religious
perspectives. Indeed, persecution on the basis of religion is arguably the most
common reason for large flows of people.
Despite the importance of religion as a 1951 Refugee Convention ground,
there has been relatively little scholarly and judicial consideration of the
meaning of the term in the United States. This obviously increases the
likelihood that flawed decisions will be made regarding an asylum seeker’s
eligibility for protection in the United States. In this article, we have argued
that religion in the context of the 1951 Refugee Convention should be
interpreted broadly, in a manner which is consistent with the history of the
Convention and with a meaning attributed to the term in the key documents
underpinning it.
Thus, for this ground to be invoked, it is not necessary for asylum seekers
to establish that they are part of a mainstream religious ideology or that the
ideology has any particular beliefs or convictions. Moreover, asylum seekers
should not be required to establish that they participate in any practices which
are tangible displays of a commitment to a religion. The central aspect of a
religion is belief in an ideology which involves an element of faith, which is
shared by some other people in the community—although there is no
minimum number of people who need to comprise such a community. In
addition to this, religion also is often part of a person’s identity or way of life,
but this is not essential in every case—it can merely be a core belief held by
an individual. The concept of a religious belief is wide-ranging and should
include theistic beliefs and convictions about the divine or spiritual aspect of
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human kind. It should not require any particular substantive ideals
underpinning the conviction. Thus, practices such as Falun Gong and even
Scientology are religions. There are numerous ways in which people can
establish that religion is a key aspect of their identity, including by the attire
they wear, the food they consume and ceremonies in which they participate.
This means that in order to establish that a person is a member of a certain
religion, it is not necessary for him or her to establish a deep understanding of
the core elements of the religion or show tangible conduct consistent with the
principles of the religion. Moreover, religious persecution can arise where an
individual is targeted for not belonging to a religion or because they are
wrongly believed to practice a certain religion.
The adoption of the above definition will clarify this area of law in a way
which is harmonious with the objectives behind the 1951 Refugee Convention
and enhance the integrity of decision making in this area of law. It will also
increase the number of people who can successfully claim asylum in the
United States and other countries that are signatories to the 1951 Refugee
Convention. This is an objective that is more important now than at any time
in recent human history.
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